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A FULL AND FREE

# INQUIRY

INTO THE

## Merits of the Peace.

51 **Full** (A) and Free Inquiry into t[illegible]
Merits of the Peace with some Strictures
on the Spirit of Party. 160 pages, 8vo,
sewn, $1.75. London, 1765.

This important pamphlet has reference to the limits
of Nova Scotia or Acadia, Newfoundland, the Hostility
of the Indians, the Privilege of the Spanish Nation to
Fish upon the Banks of Newfoundland, etc, etc.

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A FULL AND FREE

# INQUIRY

INTO THE

## Merits of the Peace;

WITH SOME

# STRICTURES

## On the Spirit of Party.

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" I love to pour out all myſelf; as plain
" As downright Shippen, or as old Montaign:
" In them, as certain to be lov'd as ſeen,
" The ſoul ſtood forth, nor kept a thought within;
" In me what ſpots (for ſpots I have) appear,
" Will prove at leaſt the medium muſt be clear."

POPE.

" *Pro Rege ſæpe, pro Republica ſemper.*"

SHEFFIELD.

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MDCCLXV.

Bodleian

# ERRATA.

PAGE 84. l. 1. for, *ſide of limitation*, read, *ſide of the line of limitation.* l. 7. for, *Mobile*, read, *Mobille.*—P. 101. l. 17. for, *rectified compleatly*, read, *rectified it compleatly.*—P. 103. l. 14. after, *century* put the *comma*, dele *at leaſt*, and before *without* inſert, *even.* l. 15. for *would have*, read, *would not have.*—P. 126. l. 7, for, *will be who*, read, *will be he who.*—P. 139. l. 20. for, *diſtant*, read, *diſtinct.*—P. 143. l. 17. for 1715, read, 1745.—P. 144. l. 14, 15. for, *were what we heard of*, read, *were what were heard of.*— P. 147. l. 6. for, *apartments*, read, *departments.* — P. 149. l. 21. for, *the forces*, read, *the Tories.*— P. 155. l. 15. for, *been driving*, read, *been ſeen driving.* — P. 157. l. 4. for, *contracted*, read, *contraſted.* — P. 159. l. 22. for, *the founded confidence*, read, *the beſt-founded confidence.*—P. 160. l. 3. after, *eſtabliſhment*, dele *comma*, and read, *eſtabliſhment of the glory.*

# A FULL AND FREE ENQUIRY INTO THE MERITS OF THE PEACE, &c.

GREAT Britain, in the courſe of the laſt war, ran a career of glory, tranſcendently ſuperior to every former period of her duration. Victory and conqueſt attended her arms in every quarter of the world: for in Europe, in Aſia, in Africa and America, the enemy and his allies were not only baffled, but vanquiſhed. Her ſubjects became immenſely enriched; her trade and commerce vaſtly extended; joy, confidence and exultation ſat on every countenance; and pleaſure, luxury and diſſipation reigned with unbounded ſway throughout all her triumphant dominions.

In the midſt of this unexampled felicity, her exchequer was emptied, her public ſtate and government not only impoveriſhed, but ſo deeply involved in debt, that ſhe ſeemed on the brink of diſſolution; for long before this time it had been fixed and eſtabliſhed as a maxim, that it was impoſſible for her to ſuſtain a load, tho' lighter by many millions than what ſhe now did, without being inevitably ſunk by it into bankruptcy and ruin.

Certain it is, that her acquiſitions in trade as well as in territory, and the riches and ſpoils ariſing from the proſperous events of the war, had raiſed her credit and enlarged her annual ſupplies far beyond her natural ability; ſupplies nevertheleſs which were but only ſufficient for maintaining her internal tranquility, ſecuring her foreign conqueſts, and accumulating diſtreſs upon the enemy, by freſh enterprizes, and diſtant expenſive and powerful expeditions. But as certain

it

it is, that whilſt her ſubjects were thus ſolidly enriched by the happy contingent ſucceſs of her public exploits, and even by the opportunities given them of fleecing her in the neceſſary loans they advanced for enabling her to make themſelves great and happy; ſhe herſelf was becoming every day more weak, more indigent and diſtreſt: and ornamented with the faireſt laurels by land and by ſea, was advancing every moment farther and farther within the ruthleſs gripe of undertakers, contractors, and alley jobbers. In ſhort her credit, and conſequently her power and importance, wholly depended on the fortuitous events of the war, and the intereſted views of money-holders.

WHILST her enlarged and very extenſive trade demanded hands for her manufactures and the navigation of her merchandize; her agriculture ſtood in need of labourers, and her enfeebled armies and fleets wanted daily recruits of men to ſupply the havock of war and the peſti-

lential deſtruction of foreign climes. Yet was the nation already drained by the numerous levies formerly made for all thoſe purpoſes; and the neceſſary policy of extending and carrying on the war ſtill farther in the ſultry regions of the ſouth, where alone the enemy was vulnerable, produced a clear aſſurance and certainty, from the deſtructiveneſs of thoſe climates to northern conſtitutions, that whether ſucceſsful or unfortunate in our future adventures, and whether employed in defending the places and countries that had been already conquered, or in invading and aſſaulting others not yet attempted, all thoſe wants and demands would increaſe more and more, without any probability or hope that the ſtate ſhould be in a capacity to afford freſh and adequate reinforcements, or even make the eſtabliſhment effective as it then ſtood. On the other hand, Great Britain ſaw herſelf every where victorious, poſſeſſed of many fair places and countries taken from the enemy, with a clear and undiſputable ſu-

periority

periority in the ocean. This ſituation gave juſt ground to expect a ſolid, honourable and advantageous peace: And theſe her internal and external circumſtances being duly attended to and diſpaſſionately conſidered, will preſent a conjuncture of flattering felicity combined with imminent danger, infinitely ſuperior to whatever had happened in her hiſtory; that of having her ſtrength and powers exerted with a conſtant flow of proſperity, ſufficient to inſpire the ſtrongeſt deſire of proceeding impetuouſly on, under the preſumptuous confidence that fortune was unalterably chained to her ſide: whilſt that ſtrength and thoſe powers having been already ſtretched to their utmoſt extent, every ſubſequent effort muſt have only diſcovered her weakneſs, and loſt her the advantages ſhe poſſeſſed of making a peace moſt conducive to her intereſt happineſs and grandeur. For in this reſpect it is the ſame in a collective body or ſtate, as in any individual perſon; who having

ſtretched

ſtretched and exerted his ſtrength and powers to the very utmoſt of his vigour, all after-efforts to increaſe and carry them further, ſerve but to impair debilitate and exhauſt him. Whoever then will attentively conſider this nice, this important and critical conjuncture, may perceive the point of time which the ſpirit of wiſdom and diſtintereſted patriotiſm would have laid hold on for putting an end to the enmity ſubſiſting between the ſeveral contending powers, and eſtabliſhing a peace to the true emolument and benefit of our country. But if we extend our view ſtill further, and include the generous motives of ſympathy and compaſſion in ſtopping the effuſion of human blood, terminating the deſolations of war, and giving repoſe to Europe; it may then appear not only wiſe and patriotic, but an act of the higheſt and moſt exalted benevolence, and ſuch as well became the dignity of That King, who is the Father of his People, and the Friend of Man.

HAD no diviſion and ſeparation happened prior to this in the adminiſtration; had Mr P, who ſo juſtly acquired the admiration and confidence of the nation, occupied ſtill the department of ſtate which he had held during the heat of the war, and been agreed and united with the reſt of the King's ſervants in accommodating a peace at this point of time: although an oppoſition might have been undoubtedly made to it from that martial ſpirit which now in general prevailed among the people, who having been worked up to an inveterate hatred and contempt of the enemy, and become arrogant by uninterrupted ſucceſs, could reliſh and approve of nothing but victories and conqueſts; and from thoſe individuals whoſe intereſt and fortunes depended on the continuance of the war: ſtill ſuch an oppoſition muſt ſoon have died away before a miniſtry ſo firm, ſo beloved and reſpected, as in that caſe the Britiſh miniſtry would have been; and the

the propriety fitneſs and utility of the tranſaction would have appeared of itſelf, upon cool reflection, and how neceſſary and perfectly conducive it was to the ſecurity happineſs and dignity of the nation. But that univerſal harmony and national concord which formerly ſubſiſted, had been for ſome time before this unhappily interrupted and broken.

A judicious preconception of the popular diſtraction of mind ariſing from this haughty martial ſpirit, become impetuous undiſcerning and intractable in the height of proſperity, might well have induced Mr P, from the beſt conceived principles of political prudence as well as of humanity, to lay hold of the earlieſt events of our ſucceſſes abroad, to invite the enemy to terms of accommodation and peace: and at length to declare, that although he had undertaken and would anſwer for the vigorous proſecution of the war, yet would he not engage, from the foreſight he had of the difficulties

ſpringing

ſpringing up out of the very greatneſs and importance of our conqueſts, to regulate the terms of our future peace. Now whatever ſtrong and efficacious reaſons juſtified this declaration and conduct at that time, thoſe very ſame reaſons did annually become ſtronger and more efficacious, according to the degree of our ſucceſs, and the new acquiſitions that we made; for in proportion as theſe advantages grew upon us, the public temper waxed more violent and inſatiable, our national ſtrength of men became more weakened, and the ſtate itſelf was ſtill farther involved and incumbered, by the vaſt and extraordinary ſupplies to be provided for carrying on the war.

UNDER theſe perplexing, but inevitable circumſtances, peace was concluded: a peace that was arraigned and condemned in daily and periodical papers, before it was known, or could be known, what the terms and conditions of it were; a

peace, that when its preliminary articles were made known, was ſtigmatized and held forth to the people as inglorious, inadequate and diſadvantageous; a peace, that being finally adjuſted and ratified, after having had its preliminaries examined debated and almoſt unanimouſly approved of by parliament, was and is made a handle of to create party, obſtruct government, and animate the people to diſcontent, if not to ſedition.

How far theſe ſtrong and heavy cenſures, paſt upon this peace, are juſt equitable and truly patriotic, will beſt appear from examining into the merits of the peace itſelf; and in doing of this, let the genuine ſpirit of candour truth and honour, direct our diſpaſſionate inquiry.

The great and univerſal principle of the law of humanity, the law of nature, and the chriſtian law, is intirely one and the ſame. "Do unto others that which you would have them do unto you," and

"Do

" Do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you :" in other words, " Love your neighbour as yourſelf :" This, however liable to cavil or miſconſtruction, is the voice of reaſon, the voice of philoſophy, the voice of religion. Sovereigns and ſovereign ſtates, however far they may be led away in their purſuits of ambition conqueſt and univerſal depredation, conceal ſtill from the world, as far as they can, their private unjuſt and partial motives. Fair generous benevolent and public conſiderations are held out to view ; the common ſenſe, and the common feelings of mankind are appealed to, in their declarations and manifeſtos ; and all their powers of genius and ability are exerted to reconcile their conduct, in appearance at leaſt, to this univerſal principle of equity juſtice and morality, which conſtitutes the law of nations.

According to this principle, no Sovereign or ſtate ought to injure any other

ſovereign or ſtate. Any ſovereign or ſtate, when injured, has a right to demand and receive ſatisfaction of the ſovereign or ſtate who committed the injury. Satisfaction being refuſed; the ſovereign or ſtate injured, has hence a right to have recourſe to force, and to exert all his own power, and the power of his allies, to obtain ſatisfaction. This is the juſt and univerſal right of war. But ſatisfaction being made, or offered to be made by the aggreſſor to the injured prince or ſtate; ſhould that not be accepted of, the juſt and univerſal right of war, appertaining to the party injured, ceaſes: and however powerful and ſucceſsful the injured prince or ſtate may afterwards prove, all the exertions of that power, and all the ſucceeding victories obtained by it, are ſo many real injuries committed by ſuch a prince or ſtate againſt him who happened to be the firſt aggreſſor; inſomuch that he will have a right, in his turn, to demand and receive ſatisfaction. The truth of this reaſoning is

freely

freely ſubmitted to every man's own feelings. He has but to apply the principle laid down to the different caſes ſtated, putting himſelf by turns in the ſituation of the oppoſite party; and the natural conſtitution and movements of his own ſpirit will fairly determine the reſt. Here then is a criterion by which I propoſe to try the merits of this peace.

The limits of Nova Scotia or Acadia, preſented the firſt object of diſpute between the two crowns of Great Britain and France. The peace of Aix la Chapelle had left this point to the diſcuſſion of commiſſaries to be nominated on each ſide for that purpoſe. This diſcuſſion was protracted. The French erected forts in the heart of that very province whoſe boundaries were then the ſubject of enquiry. They eſtabliſhed a chain of poſts and garriſons from thence, over an immence tract of country, as far as the banks of the Miſſiſippi. They cut off not only his majeſty's ſubjects from all intercourſe with the Indian nations and the

the inland rivers and lakes, the ſource of commerce and future improvements; but held the whole Britiſh dominion in North America in ſuch a manner at their diſcretion, as to be capable to invade, or over-run it, ſo as through it to open to themſelves a communication with the ſea at pleáſure. Theſe operations of the French gave riſe to expoſtulation complaint and demands of ſatisfaction, on the part of Great Britain. Theſe demands were not attended to, ſatisfaction was not made; and, on that account, a juſt, a neceſſary, and proſperous war enſued. At length, after a ſeries of diſtinguiſhed and heroic actions, the ſovereign will of Heaven, and the ſignal valour of the Britiſh arms, reduced the enemy to terms of moderation, and a ſincere deſire of peace.

To have withdrawn their garriſons, to have relinquiſhed their new-erected forts, and to have admitted the limits of Nova Scotia to have been ſuch as they them-

themſelves had deſcribed them when that country was in their own poſſeſſion; would have been, previous to the war, a full fair and ample ſatisfaction. The matter referred by the peace of Aix la Chapelle to future diſcuſſion, would have been thereby intirely ſettled; and that peace, itſelf, fixed upon a more ſolid and permanent foundation. This was all that we could have aſked; this was, indeed, all that we did aſk.

At adjuſting the late peace, that is now under conſideration, not only theſe limits and forts became our intire right and property: but to indemnify and compenſate for the injuries that had been done by erecting the forts and refuſing to admit the claimed limits, which two objects were the only cauſe and ſource of the war; the crown of France ceded all Canada Cape-Breton and St John in the north, all Louiſiana north and eaſt of the river Miſſiſippi in the ſouth, and all the immenſe lands rivers and lakes lying

lying between them, with all their towns forts iſlands and dependances: Regions of ſuch vaſt extent as to comprehend every climate and every ſoil, therefore fruitful reſourſes for every kind of art induſtry and invention; larger in dimenſion than the half of Europe, and much more capable of every kind of improvement; and which, in their population and cultivation, will give ſcope to human genius and human induſtry for ages to come. The very length of time that it demands to improve and cultivate them, lays the ſureſt and beſt foundations for the future ſtrength riches and grandeur of Great Britain; and for our colonies themſelves becoming a great and mighty empire, under the influence and direction of the mother country; or of ſtanding forth to the world her illuſtrious and auguſt heir and repreſentative, when in the impenetrable depths of futurity, by ſome hoſtile foreign ſtroke, or ſome more dreadful internal convulſion, the effects of corruption proſtitution

and

and ſelf-intereſted faction, Great Britain ſhall be no more.

WHAT were the ſentiments of the nation before and during the war?—That our colonies in North America merited the firſt and chief attention and care of their mother country; that the progreſs they had made ſince their ſettlement, the ſhipping they employed, the manufactures they conſumed, the returns they were capable of making in various articles and commodities that were ſupplied us by foreign nations; the treaſure they were capable of acquiring upon a due encouragement being given to their trade, which would ultimately circulate home: all theſe, and the great capacity they had of enlarging and extending all theſe, made them not only an object preferable to all others, but of ſuch eſſential importance, that the nation might continue to grow rich and great and powerful, by her intercourſe with them only, were ſhe deprived

of every other means of commerce. That the importance of this object was ſtill increaſed from this conſideration, that moſt and ſome of the greateſt powers of Europe had opened their eyes and given their attention to trade: that hence by its becoming more general, and by many nations ſupplying themſelves with what we were formerly in uſe to furniſh them, or to carry for them, the trade itſelf was become leſs extenſive in our hands, and the profits ariſing from it very conſiderably diminiſhed.—That we were already outdone in ſome branches, and overreached in others.—That under theſe circumſtances, our colonies in this new world of our own were our only and beſt refuge; and our future happineſs depended upon improving them.—That environed as they were by French encroachments, French forts and French communications; cut off as they were from the faireſt richeſt and beſt part of the country by French ſettlements and garriſons on the Ohio, the Miſſiſippi,

and

and the lakes; theſe very colonies, our laſt reſource, were in the moſt imminent danger: that nothing too great, nothing too expenſive, nothing too hazardous could be undertaken for their relief: every thing was to be attempted; for the time was now come for trial, and a trial not to be avoided, whether Great Britain or France excelled as a naval power.

I appeal, with all the reſpect and confidence that truth inſpires, to thoſe gentlemen who ſtill live and were then in the adminiſtration, whether the voice of our colonies in memorials addreſſes and applications did not inculcate and preſs upon them theſe ſentiments. I appeal to the greater and ſmaller publications, to almoſt every production of the preſs in thoſe times, for the illuſtration and proof of them. But chiefly and above all, I appeal to my fellow countrymen of every rank and order, in place and out of place, inclined to this or that ſet of men, whigs or tories; and chiefly to

thoſe who are inviolably attached to truth, independent of the intereſt of any party or faction of men, whether theſe ſentiments were not univerſal? Whether they were not the ſentiments and ſpirit of the nation? Whether this ſpirit did not at length make an impreſſion upon the gentlemen that were in the adminiſtration at that time, and impel them, in ſpite of their almoſt inflexible indolence and love of peace, to a ſpecies of warlike meaſures which in a courſe of time produced the war itſelf? Whether in the vigorous and ſpirited proſecution of the war, the ſame ſentiments the ſame ſpirit did not guide the adminiſtration and the nation? Whether views, ſolely influenced by theſe ſentiments, did not direct the diſcuſſions of the peace ſo far as they were diſcuſſed by Mr P? And whether they did not continue to be the ſentiments of the nation, as well as adminiſtration, at the eve of the peace itſelf, negotiated and concluded by his majeſty's ſervants?

HOLDING

HOLDING as undoubtedly certain, that theſe motives of the war were juſt, and theſe ſentiments of the nation true; let the merits of the peace be conſidered as relative to both.

ENVIRONED, O Britain, as your colonies were by hoſtile forts; this peace has converted them into forts of defence and ſecurity. Checked and encroached upon in the limits of Acadia; this peace hath extended thoſe limits to your utmoſt wiſhes. Excluded and cut off from the faireſt and richeſt regions of North America, from the rivers and the lakes; this peace has made theſe coveted and envied ſituations all your own. The fruits of the enemies indefatigable invention, labour, wit, improvement and expence, for upwards of a century, are all your own. Theſe colonies, whoſe proſperity, without any other commercial connections, were ſufficient to have ſupported your riches your greatneſs and

power;

power; whoſe improvement and cultivation were to form your future fortune and happineſs: all theſe colonies are now freed by this peace from every apprehenſion and danger with which a vigilent active enterprizing and powerful rival could threaten them; and all his poſſeſſions, that could raiſe any jealouſy or do any hurt, are now become yours.—If the improvement of your colonies before theſe acquiſitions was of ſo great importance; how infinitely is their value increaſed at this time, when every obſtruction is removed, and ſcenes of improvement are laid open that the warmeſt imagination could not have hoped for?—Yet even this is not all: for by this peace an additional ſource of riches and ſecurity is thrown into your ſcale, by bounding and terminating your immenſe poſſeſſions with the acquiſition of Florida; an acquiſition which, abſtracted from the conſideration of its favourable climate and the extent of the territory itſelf, furniſhes you with a ſituation of all

all others, next to the Havanah, the moſt deſirable to check the pride of Spain, and render her ſupplies of treaſure in the time of war ineffectual. In a word, America was the object of the war; the ſentiments of the nation before the war, and during the war, were fixed upon America only, preferably to every other object; Mr P conformed his views to theſe ſentiments in his diſcuſſions of the peace; and the king's ſervants in concluding it, adhered invariably to them, and improved upon thoſe diſcuſſions.—Yet even this is not all: for by this peace, the valuable ſugar iſlands of St Vincent, Dominica, Tobaga, the Grenades and Grenadines, are ceded and added to your dominion; which afford not only a fair and ſure proſpect of enlarging this branch of trade, but of augmenting and enhancing the trade of North America itſelf: and the ceſſion of Senegal and its dependencies greatly heightens and extends your African commerce. I conclude therefore, that as the war was begun

gun and carried on in conformity to the true and real ſpirit and ſentiment of the nation; the peace was likewiſe framed conformably to the ſame ſpirit and ſentiment: that the end and motive of the war was fully accompliſhed: and in regard to the dominion acquired by it, conſidering its nature, the improvement and immediate increaſe it gives to national trade, and the future but certain glorious proſpect of riches and power to be neceſſarily derived from it, it is clearly and truly a peace not only of acquiſition, but of ſecurity and full indemnification; and conſequently an honourable, adequate and advantageous peace.

THE objections to this peace, in all their force, are theſe.

THE diſtracted and ruined condition of France, beaten out of the Eaſt and almoſt intirely out of the Weſt Indies, without a fleet, without a treaſury, a bankrupt people, and a government without credit; all

all this taken along with the prosperous and triumphant condition of Great Britain, and the important acquisitions she had made from the year 1761 that the negociation was broke off by Mr P, to the year 1762 that the conferences were renewed by Lord B: gave a fair and advantageous opportunity, on the recommencement of these conferences, for weakening and humbling France as a maritime power, and for raising and agrandising the importance of Great Britain in this respect, so as to render the former incapable hereafter to hurt, and the latter for the future perfectly secure. That the enormous debt of the nation necessarily incurred by the war, and solely occasioned by the bad faith and rapacious spirit of France, called aloud for indemnification and reimbursement. That both the one and the other of these were to have been obtained by excluding intirely the French from the fish trade of Newfoundland and the gulph of St. Laurence, and by

at leaſt keeping poſſeſſion of the rich and precious iſland of Guadaloup in the Weſt Indies, and both the ſettlements of Goree and Senegal on the coaſt of Africa. Theſe would have been to us an immediate ſource of riches and ſtrength, by giving the moſt extenſive ſcope to trade, augmenting our ſhipping, and eſtabliſhing an inexhauſtable nurſery of ſeamen, the only true and ſolid ſtrength of the nation. The intereſt of North America itſelf required this, as Guadaloup would have been a great and additional market for their lumber and proviſions; and the proſperity and advantages thereby mutually ariſing to both, would in the reſult have highly advanced the intereſt and proſperity of Britain. That it would have been infinitely more eligible, rather than have failed in this point, to have admitted the French again into a part of their former poſſeſſions in North America, and given them the barren ſoil of Canada to work upon: for the advantages ariſing there,

are

are at a very remote period, not to ſay very uncertain; but thoſe proceeding from the poſſeſſion of the ſugar iſlands are immediate and of the moſt ſubſtantial kind, and what the debt of the nation ſtands in the moſt immediate and real need of. But in place of all this, to reinſtate the French in the fiſhery, the African and ſugar trade; is to reſtore to them all the certain ſources of that naval power by which they have been already ſo very formidable, and will again be enabled very ſoon to give ſcope to their inſatiable ambition by a renewal of the war. When added to all this it is taken into view, that they are reſtored intirely to all their former trade in the Eaſt Indies; that the intereſt of our heroic and magnanimous ally, the King of Pruſſia, was deſerted from the beginning to the end of the treaty; and that out of all our important conqueſts in the Weſt Indies, only the worſt of the neutral iſlands with the inſignificant iſlands of the Grenades and Grenadines

were ſhared out to us, whilſt St Lucia and its excellent port were given up to the French: we may venture to conclude, notwithſtanding all the additional conqueſts we made in the interval of the diſcuſſions of peace, that the difinitive treaty, with all thoſe advantages ſaid to be on its ſide, has concluded a much worſe peace than what Mr P planned, even when he was as to Germany under many and great difficulties, and as to the Weſt Indies unprovided with the conqueſts of Martinico and the Havana; and that upon the whole the peace is inadequate to our conqueſts, diſhonourable diſadvantageous and inſecure.

Moſt unqueſtionably true it is, that to have excluded the French wholly from the fiſh trade in North America, to have retained in our own hands Guadaloup Senegal and Goree, would have been highly advantageous to the commercial intereſt of Great Britain.

But

But why ſtop here? Would it not have been immenſely more advantageous, to have retained all our conqueſts, to have kept poſſeſſion of Martinico the Havanna and all the neutral iſlands, and to have excluded the French forever from the Eaſt Indies? Undoubtedly it would. When you have once paſſed the line of moderation and juſtice, there is nothing afterwards to ſtop your career. All this, both in the one and the other caſe, is the ſpirit of violence dominion and conqueſt. It is the ſpirit of a Gengizchan, a Tamerlane, a Louiſquatorze, who deſpoiled the earth, and waſted the race of men, for their own private emolument and glory; who terminated the limits of right by the ſword, and meaſured the boundaries of juſtice by the extent of their power. We are a people and nation of a very different complexion and character. We have the peculiar and ſacred privilege of being free. This very freedom inſpires, or ought to inſpire us, with the higheſt

juſtice

juſtice and moderation. Shall we who have been calling upon heaven and earth for almoſt a century paſt to ſave Europe from the univerſal dominion of France; we who have expended ſo many thouſands of men, and ſo many millions of money, inſomuch that we have enrich'd the continent with our negociations and ſubſidies, to no other purpoſe than to promote and eſtabliſh the liberties of Europe, and to keep the deſpotic powers of the earth within a ſtate of mediocrity and juſtice: ſhall we, the very firſt moment that providence has put it in our election to manifeſt to the world what ſpirit we really are of, give the lie to all our moſt ſolemn profeſſions, to all our moſt generous diſintereſted and heroic exploits; and diſplay to mankind a ſpirit as licentious unbounded and ambitious as that of France, againſt which at different times we have aſſociated with all Europe in order to depreſs it, and bring it back to the ſtandard of equity and humanity? Is

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not this moſt publicly and inconteſtably to declare, that our ambition is as ſtrong, our deſire of dominion as large and unmeaſurable, as his was whom we have oppoſed; that our views and our objects of purſuit were the ſame with his; and that we obſtructed him not as an enemy, but as a rival, being now determined to controul the world ourſelves? —The truth of this reaſoning will be fully illuſtrated by having recourſe to the principle we ſet out upon.

For this purpoſe let us reverſe the ſcene, and imagine ourſelves in the place of the enemy at the time of ſettling the conditions of peace. Let us ſuppoſe that we had incroached upon the ſettlements of the French, and that in the courſe of the war raiſed upon this account, the moſt Chriſtian king had ſucceeded in his enterpriſes againſt our ſettlements in North America, taken all our iſlands in the Weſt Indies but one, expelled us from the Eaſt Indies and

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the coaſt of Africa; and that we had been ſo unlucky as to take from him only one iſland of no importance in point of commerce, but valuable for its ſituation in time of war, and an excellent place of arms, eſpecially for that branch which reſpects the marine, and on this account was of conſiderable importance to the enemy. This deſcription will anſwer to our iſland of Minorca. That beſides this, we had got poſſeſſion of ſome places and territories belonging to the enemy's allies, and had a kingdom belonging to his moſt cloſe and intimate ally at our diſcretion, and ready to be over-run and conquered in caſe we ſhould be put to the laſt extremity. This account will directly co-inceed with the ſituation of Hanover Heſs and Brunſwick, and the kingdom of Portugal. Under theſe circumſtances we repreſent to the enemy, that it is impoſſible to ſettle the point of offence that gives juſt riſe to wars between great ſovereigns. Their ideas and conceptions of titles

titles rights limits and poſſeſſions are ſo divided and oppoſite the one to the other, and the reaſons of ſtate and public utility ſo mix and blend themſelves in the ſentiments and opinions of each court, that it is impoſſible they ſhould ever agree in this point. Much more ſo in the preſent caſe, where the territory claimed by the one ſovereign as his right by charters, was the very ſame with that claimed by the other as his right by occupation and poſſeſſion in the fulleſt and ampleſt manner for a long ſeries of years, and deriving an additional ſtrength from being unqueſtioned in ſeveral treaties, mutually confirming and guarantying one another's poſſeſſions. That in conſequence of this, ſome ſuch miſunderſtanding muſt have aroſe from the conduct of one or other of the parties at ſome time or other, had not the preſent quarrel exiſted. That this point being duly conſidered, it ought to remove every idea of premeditated and determined malevolence in one ſovereign

towards the other, and introduce that equitable ſpirit of moderation and humanity which pays the higheſt regard to the general intereſts of men, that by which all civilized nations are ſo much governed, and which the circumſtances of Europe ſo much require, as to make it an eſſential part of that law which ought to direct the conduct of nations. That upon this principle we not only would give up the limits contended for, which were the occaſion of the war: but to prevent all future miſunderſtanding, and as a compenſation and indemnification of the injury alledged to be done, and the trouble and expence incurred by the war, we would cede and guaranty to him forever, not only Canada, but all that part of Louiſiana lying on the left ſide of the Miſſiſippi, and all the adjoining regions and countries, with all their dependencies. That the object of the war being thus obtained and ſatisfaction made, we expected that the liberty of fiſhing on the banks of Newfoundland

foundland ſhould be confirmed to us as heretofore; it being a ſubject altogether diſtinct from the war, and deriving its ſource from the treaty of Utrecht. And for this purpoſe that an iſland ſhould be reſtored to us for the ſhelter and ſecurity of our veſſels in that trade, but which ſhould never be fortified in any manner whatever, and conſequently could give no umbrage or create any jealouſy. That in lieu of the Havana, he ſhould have all the territory of Florida and the Mobille; which would not only greatly extend but highly improve his dominions, and give them a form and boundary the leaſt liable to all exceptions for the future. That to enrich him ſtill more, he ſhould have three out of four of the neutral ſugar iſlands; and the Grenades and Grenadines, improved and flouriſhing iſlands of our own, in lieu of the fourth. And as to all other advantages and conqueſts on the one ſide and the other, as they were the conſequences of the war,

not cauſes of it, they ought only to be conſidered as the means on both ſides for obtaining peace: wherefore out of regard to the general intereſt of Europe, and to put a ſtop to the further effuſion of human blood, and to reſtore the bleſſings of peace to the world, they ſhould be mutually given up on both ſides; except that Senegal ſhould remain an acquiſition to the enemy, and that we ſhould be obliged to erect no fortifications, or keep any troops, in any of our ſettlements in Bengal.

Had we, in the diſtreſſed condition of France, made all theſe large and valuable conceſſions to him; and by ſubjecting ourſelves to keep many of our ſettlements defenceleſs and unprotected by fortifications and troops, in ſo far ſacrificed our ſecurity as well as our intereſt for the ſake of obtaining peace: and had he mercileſs and unrelenting, buoyed up with his ſucceſs, and planning in the height of his imperious pride our utter deſtruction; ſtill

ſtill perſiſted to afflict us with a continuance of the war, unleſs we would even annihilate our hopes of being ever any more a naval power, and of being ever any more able to employ and enrich our people, by giving up our claims to the fiſhery, and ceding forever one or more of our principal ſugar iſlands: had he done all this, what would our ſentiments and conduct have been? Let every man fairly and thoroughly realize this picture in his own mind, then lay his hand on his heart, and ſpeak what paſſes there.

COULD the moſt diſtinguiſhed afflictions of a nation move compaſſion; the public diſtreſs of the ſtate, the univerſal Bankruptcy of our people, the want of credit with foreign nations and the inability of our nobles and clergy, tho' ſtript even of their public and private plate, to bring any ſufficient relief, had long ere this excited the commiſeration and ſoftened into compliance the reſentment of a generous enemy. Could the

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moſt exorbitant and enormous ceſſions have gratified his lucrative and ambitious views; the ceſſions we have tendered had more than gorged him. But the moſt juſt and ample ſatisfaction for the injury that occaſioned the war; the moſt extenſive important and liberal indemnification and ſecurity for all the expence and conſequences of it; the extent of many kingdoms given up, the ſure and infallible ſources of trade riches power dominion and empire; even the beſt and moſt important of our ſettlements on the coaſt of Africa thrown into the ſcale; theſe, even all theſe, are ſtill inſufficient to ſatiate his implacable and cruel rage, inflated as he is with victory, and imperious in conqueſt. The conteſt therefore appears no longer to be about an injury done or received, about the limits of Nova Scotia and our incroachments upon one another's territory; but whether we ſhall be forever deleted from the roll of fame, and never mentioned more as a name of reſpect amongſt the

the nations. Long had his open and concealed efforts at unbounded dominion and illimitable power been by us rendered abortive, long had Great Britain ſtood the ſhield and bulwark of Europe againſt all his oppreſſions. This is the real injury that rankles in his heart: and convinced that he cannot ſucceed, whilſt we are in a condition to reſiſt him; he is determined on improving the preſent favourable opportunity of his victories, to accompliſh our utter deſtruction. And ſhall we, forgetful of what we are and what we have been; ſhall we a brave and free people, unmindfull of our priſtine fame and unſullied glory, ſubmit our necks to the yoke, and become the tame ſlaves of haughty inſolence and arrogant injuſtice? No, let us rather periſh as we have lived, free and undaunted: and leave to the world a fair and genuine proof of the true and excellent ſpirit of our conſtitution, by chuſing rather not to exiſt at all, than to exiſt without honour, without dignity,

ty, without the influence of Laws, and without being free from the arbitrary controul and oppreſſion of a conqueror. Heaven and earth will approve of ſo virtuous ſo magnanimous and truely glorious a reſolution; heaven and earth will aſſiſt us in the arduous conflict. Our reſources are ſtill great; let every one in his ſtation exert himſelf to the utmoſt, and animate his neighbour.—We have a generous and free people, and their courage yet unbroken, which the divine energy will convert into heroic ardour. Europe now ſees the veil of moderation and juſtice thrown aſide; and that Europe whom we have ſo often ſaved, will at length conſpire our deliverance from the adamantine hand of power, and the ruthleſs violence of univerſal dominion. Confident in ſo good a cauſe, let us inſtantly break off all treaty, bidding open and everlaſting defiance to the enemy; and repoſing our truſt in the Almighty and our own active virtue, expect the event with inflexible fortitude. This

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greateſt and higheſt conſolation ſtill remains, that by acting thus, ſhould even the worſt and moſt fatal cataſtrophe attend our affairs, we ſhall fall approved of by ourſelves, and admired and praiſed to endleſs ages, wherever true virtue liberty and glory are held in veneration upon earth.—Would not theſe, or ſuch as theſe, have been our ſentiments; this, or ſuch as this, our conduct? With perfect ſecurity I dare make the appeal to every man worthy of the name of Briton, and reſt aſſured of his ſuffrage.—But ſhould the timid prudence of the ſtate have got the better of the bold and daring ſpirit of the conſtitution, and a peace been accepted upon ſuch diſhonourable and deſtructive terms, would it have been a peace that in the nature of things could have kept together: Or rather would it not have been made uſe of to ſtrengthen and repare the injuries and loſſes we had ſuſtained, and to enable us, as ſoon as it was practicable, to break aſunder our fetters, and commit our high revenge to the deciſion of providence, and

the horrours and deſolation of a future war? Unqueſtionably this would have been the caſe; or we muſt have loſt our freedom and importance as a nation for ever.

Let us return to the true ſtate of our affairs, nor heſitate with truth to acknowledge, that having put ourſelves in the enemy's place, and being thereby ſenſible of the inſupportable injury and injuſtice that would have been done to us by impoſing upon us ſeverer conditions than thoſe equitable advantageous and even liberal conceſſions we had been willing in that ſituation to make; it would in our own turn have been likewiſe unjuſt, as well as impolitic and deſtructive of the future repoſe and tranquillity of Europe, for us to have inſiſted upon advantages and acquiſitions, which rather than ſubmit to, France was determined to ſuffer every calamity and run every riſk that the precarious ſituation of his affairs could preſent to him. The principle of honour

and

and glory in France, operates nearly what the principle of virtue and liberty does in Great Britain. The honour of the nation, the dignity of the prince, and the univerſal attachment of the people to both theſe objects, can nearly effect what with us is accompliſhed by our conſtitution and laws, and the ſtrong and manly affections of our people to that freedom and independency which they produce. France is capable of the greateſt firmneſs, and the ſpirit of the diſcerning and judicious Monteſquieu may be ſaid to be the ſpirit of all the French nobility, where alluding to Louis Quatorze and the diſtreſſed circumſtances he was reduced to by the victorious arms of Great Britain and her allies, he ſays, " I know nothing ſo mag-
" nanimous as the reſolution taken by a
" monarch who reigned in the preſent
" age, to bury himſelf under the ruins of
" the throne, rather than accept of pro-
" poſitions which a king ought not to
" underſtand: He had a ſoul too haughty
" to deſcend lower than his misfortunes

 " had

" had placed him; and he well knew, " that courage might eſtabliſh a crown, " but that infamy never could." * Let us do public as well as private juſtice. The ſpirit of Louis Quatorze reigns ſtill in the court of France, with this favourable circumſtance on their ſide, that the real ſtrength and ſpirit of the nation, in men and arms, was infinitely leſs broken and exhauſted at the concluſion of the laſt war, than in that which produced the treaty of Utrecht. Neither the courage nor force of France were overmatched in the laſt war by that of Great Britain; but in the conduct and ability of her

* Je ne ſçache rien de ſi magnanime, que la reſolution que prit un Monarque qui a régné de nos Jours, de s'enſévelir plutôt ſous les débris du Trône, que d'accepter des propoſitions qu'un roi ne doit pas entendre: Il avoit l'ame trop fiere, pour deſcendre plus bas que ſes malheurs ne l'avoient mis; et il ſçavoit bien que le courage peut raffermir un couronne, et que l'infamie ne le fait jamais. *Grandeur et Decadence des Romains, Chap.* 5.

her commanders by ſea and land, Great Britain did indeed ſuperlatively excell.

HAVING by the application of this univerſal principle of right and wrong to the caſe in hand, explained the inſufficiency weakneſs and injuſtice of the arguments brought againſt the peace; it will be proper now to examine theſe arguments more particularly, viz. as they have reſpect to the intereſt of Great Britain, and to the merits of the two ſeveral negotiations carried on in the years 1761 and 1762.

THE acquiſitions which we had made in the interval between the negotiation of 1761 and 1762, gave an opportunity it is ſaid of humbling France, and agrandizing Great Britain; the enormous national debt contracted in the war, required reimburſement: And both the one and the other of theſe might have been effected, by excluding the French from the fiſh trade, and by keeping poſſeſſion of Guadaloupe Senegal and Goree.

As France could not be brought to theſe terms, it was neceſſary in order to have effected this purpoſe, that we ſhould have broken off this ſecond negotiation, and committed our hope to the contingent ſucceſs of our arms in the future proſecution of the war. To have carried on the war, our national debt muſt have annually increaſed at leaſt between ten and twelve millions. Our manufactures and our tillage complained loudly at that time for want of hands. Our army and navy were nearly deficient one half of their complement of men. The extent of our conqueſts, as well as the freſh expeditions to be undertaken, would have required a large augmentation of our forces. And, additional to all this, the annual loſs of men in the courſe of the war, and by malignant climates, muſt have been conſtantly ſupplied to ſecure our conqueſts, as well as to annoy the enemy. Under theſe circumſtances and having this fair view of the caſe before us; was it for the intereſt

tereſt of the nation to contract a debt more than the value of the ſubject to be contended for, and at a time when oppreſſed by the unwieldy and exorbitant debt already contracted? Was it her intereſt to have her manufactures and her navigation at a ſtand for want of hands, when her trade called for them moſt; and when ſhe moſt ſtood in need of that trade, to enable her to ſupport the paſt burthens of the war? Was it for her intereſt to bleed on and diminiſh her ſtrength, already too much exhauſted, by the freſh ſupplies of men requiſite to fill up the waſted ranks of her armies and the thin muſtered complements of her fleets, at a time when to cultivate and improve her American dominions more ſupplies were wanted than ſhe could of herſelf have afforded in her moſt abundant and prolifick ſtate? To ſpeak in great moderation, it required I apprehend at leaſt 30,000 men to compleat her forces by ſea and land. The further extention of the war would have required an augmentation of our forces to at leaſt

10 or 15,000 men, in order to make and ſecure future conqueſts; or even to keep the kingdom of Portugal from being intirely vanquiſhed: And to recruit and keep up all this force, it would have been neceſſary to have furniſhed the annual ſupplies of at leaſt 15 or 20,000 men more. Was it for the intereſt of Great Britain to have done all this? Or, rather in attempting to do it, muſt not our manufactures, our tillage, our trade been inevitably diminiſhed and in a great meaſure ruined and loſt? Would we not, indeed, by ſuch a conduct, have loſt the ſubſtance in purſuit of the ſhadow?— Theſe are ſelf-evident facts which carry their own authority with them to whoſoever will condeſcend diſpaſſionately to weigh them: And this muſt have turned out to be the ruinous ſituation of our affairs, even ſuppoſing our proſperous fortunes had continued to attend us in our future expeditions and conqueſts.

But what a diſmal ſcene of adverſity muſt this conduct have produced, had that kind diſpoſing providence which had ſo liberally hitherto gratified our moſt ardent wiſhes, become at length weary of our inſatiable purſuits after glory; and, ſhifting to the enemy's ſide, checked our immoderate ambition? For we owed much to this providence, otherwiſe and moſt faſhionably ſtiled fortune fate and chance. Not to mention the Royal Hero of Pruſſia, who was an unparalelled miracle of its favour from the beginning to the end of the war; whoever hath been himſelf an actor, or whoever has had an opportunity of being acquainted with the nice and critical movements upon which the fate of our ſeveral expeditions and campaigns turned, muſt be a thorough infidel indeed, not to acknowledge, after doing the higheſt juſtice to the merit of the reſpective commanders, and to the courage and intrepidity of the troops, that Heaven in a remarkable manner ordered every thing to our purpoſe, and gave the finiſhing eclat

to all our exploits. He will remember, in 1757, the kind protecting hand of providence, firſt in clearing up the face of day, when that tremendous ſtorm encompaſſed our fleet, which would have otherwiſe overwhelmed it in inevitable deſtruction on the coaſt of Louiſbourg; and then in infatuating the enemy to neglect the favourable opportunity of attacking our diſabled and diſperſed fleet with their formidable ſquadron, that had been ſhielded by their port, and uninjured by the tempeſt; thereby ſaving us a ſecond time from perdition, and the nation from the loſs of twenty line-of-battle ſhips, which at that time would have given France a clear ſuperiority at ſea. He will remember in 1758, at the landing made at Louiſbourg, when the roughneſs of the ſea, the ruggedneſs of the ſhore, and the enemy's impregnable lines, threatned rout and ruin upon that expedition, how the ſame celeſtial interpoſition ſtruck the enemy with a pannick, and rendered our attack victorious. He will remember in

1759,

1759, when by the capacity and vigilance of the enemy our intrepid general was reduced to the laſt ſcene of deſpair before Quebec, how the ſame over-ruling providence conveyed us by the enemy's poſt at Sellery, undiſcovered tho' challenged by the centries as our boats paſs'd along to the attack; and, having ſealed with a profound ſleep the eyes of the guard who defended the hill, kept by this circumſtance the debarkation of our men from being perceived, rendered the attack of the hill itſelf practicable, and brought our little handful of troops upon the plains of Abraham, which produced the memorable battle of Quebec. He will remember the ſame providential care in the unforeſeen and undeſigned tho' opportune and ſalutary moment of the capitulation of Guadaloupe, when the very inſtant after it was concluded, ſuccours arrived to the aſſiſtance of the iſland, more than ſufficient to have blaſted our hopes and ruined our enterprize. He will remember in 1760 the ſame divine power giving ſuc-

ceſs to the amazing and not to be expected footing that our troops made good on the impregnable rock of Belle-iſle. He will recollect the tremours, the pannicks, the fugitive retreats of the enemy in 1762, from the impenetrable poſts of Morne-Tortonſon and Morne-Garnier in Martinico; the unneceſſary unaccountable flight of Monſ La Touche, the governor, from Fort Royal; the ſurrender of that fort, uninjured in its works and in the vigour of its defence; as well as Monſ La Touche's ſurrender of the capital St Pierre, before the ſemblance of danger appeared: and acknowledge the ſame providential influence as confounding the judgment, and unnerving the heart, of the devoted enemy. Theſe are a few inſtances; for to repeat all, would be to run over the tranſactions of the war. And had this divine and over-ruling impulſe at length taken part with the enemy, and exerted its energy in fruſtrating our purſuits after conqueſt; how ſoon would our freſh blooming laurels have withered!

and

and our ſplendid victories and conqueſts become the gaudy grave of our high fame and warlike reputation!

ABSTRACTED from whatever might have been the decrees of fate, it is not at all difficult to account, agreeably to the common current of human affairs, how in the further proſecution of the war, adverſity might have ſucceeded to the happy fortunes we had hitherto experienced. The ſpirit of party and cabal had already taken hold of the nation, that Dæmon ſpirit which divides diſtracts and animates a people to mutual jealouſies and injuries againſt one another; which firſt foretells public calamities and diſtreſs, and then exerts her utmoſt efforts to bring about the perfect accompliſhment of her malevolent wiſhes. What this ſpirit would have effected in the proſecution of the war, may with a degree of certainty be inferred from what in part it did effect at the cloſe of the war. Towards the cloſe of the war, every accident was aggra-

vated

vated into a crime: and at a time when the government was exerting its higheſt efforts againſt the enemy, it was given out, that the miniſtry wiſhed for diſgrace and infamy to our arms. Witneſs the French landing upon Newfoundland in the firſt place, and the attack and ſiege of the Havana in the ſecond. Every thing was attempted, to throw us back into the barbarity of the laſt century. The age of ſcience and refinement has been polluted with the rudeneſs ſcurrility and abuſe of the moſt illiterate and brutal times. Local diſtinctions which have now no real exiſtence, have been revived; one part of the nation has been inſulted, as it were, by the other; one part declared alien to the other; Engliſhman and Scotchman have been terms bandied about only to inſpire haughtineſs and contempt on one ſide, jealouſy and indignation on the other. Thus hath Great Britain been attempted to be torn to pieces, in order to rouſe her ſons to mortal feuds, and ſteel their breaſts with implacable hatred towards one another.

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To have continued the war under theſe circumſtances, cool recollection will acknowledge, would have been to have betrayed the nation and all its glory and intereſt to the enemy. In our armies and navies, amongſt our officers and men, under this infernal ſpirit of animoſity; mutual reſentments, mutual injuries, mutual aims and deſires of fruſtrating one another's fame and ſucceſs, would have moſt effectually ſubdued us, and given him his turn of triumph. Along with theſe diſcordant humours that had in part infected the people, and which have been ſince carried ſtill further; let us conſider the violent internal convulſions that might naturally have happened all over the kingdom, from the ſtagnation that would have neceſſarily been occaſioned in our manufactures, our trade, our agriculture, by the taking off of ſuch vaſt numbers of men to ſerve in the war: and how much all this muſt have affected the public revenue, as well as the private circumſtances of every individual in the nation: and

how

how ſoon miſery and want, headed by faction and party rage, would have ſwelled into inſurrection and rebellion. In the laſt place let us obſerve, in what light we ſhould then have appeared to the reſt of the powers of Europe. How from the motives of the war being conceived by them to be moſt amply recompenced by the conceſſions the enemy had offered, they might have regarded the protraction of it on our part, as proceeding from an exorbitant deſire of naval power and dominion. How expedient they might have thought it to declare themſelves averſe to a ſtate becoming abſolute by ſea, as well from the general ill conſequences threatning the whole by the ballance being broken, and an undue ſhare of power thrown into any one ſcale, as by the danger which they might have thought threatned the particular intereſt of every one of them who had already eſtabliſhed or were about to eſtabliſh a ſyſtem of commerce. How France might have worked upon theſe jealouſies and fears

already

already formed and prepared to his hand, and by that means have brought about a general alliance againſt us for endeavouring at univerſal dominion by ſea, as important and formidable as ever we collected againſt him for attempting the ſame by land. This is not a raſh and chimerical imagination. Let us conſider how ſtrongly attached the Swedes and the Dutch were to the court of France; and under the preſent appearance of things, how much their intereſt as well as inclination might have led them to turn this attachment into the ſtricteſt confederacy and union. How practicable it might have been, in this general alarm of danger diffuſed over Europe, for this grand confederacy, aided by all the influence power and intereſt of the empire the court of Spain and the pope, to have conſtrained by terror, as well as induced by allurements of intereſt, the republic of Venice to join her force with theirs. In that caſe this republic could have furniſhed twenty line-of-battle ſhips of eighty guns each, to the com-

bined ſquadron. This taken along with the united efforts of France Spain Sweden and Holland, would, I humbly conceive, have produced a naval force ſufficient to diſpute the dominion of the ſeas with Great Britain in the meridian of her ſtrength, and much more than ſufficient at this time, exhauſted as ſhe was by the unparalleled efforts of a long and bloody war. But ſhould an over-weening indulgence to our own merit, think all this not enough; ſure this taken along with our internal weakneſs, the malevolence of our parties, the tumults diſtractions and violence of our people already deſcribed, would have been more than ſufficient to have covered us with the moſt dreadful calamities.

It is objected, that rather than have parted with Guadaloupe, it would have been infinitely more eligible to have admitted the French again into a part of their former poſſeſſions in North America, and given them the barren ſoil of Canada to work upon.

There

THERE is nothing ſo abſurd but what may be admitted as moſt evidently right and true, after the minds of men are properly prepared to receive it. Impreſs once upon the people the idea of incapacity in the government, and a ſuſpicion and jealouſy of its intentions; and then the wiſeſt and beſt meaſures will appear imprudent and hurtful. But can we ſo forget the hair-breadth eſcapes we have already had, from the French having been ſettled in America; and the immenſe efforts it required, and the prodigious public debt it has involved us in, to drive them out of it: that we ſhould now ſo eaſily and readily barter their return, for the acquiſition of a ſugar iſland? Would this iſland, however magnified in its produce and importance, for greatly magnified it has been; * anſwer to the hazard we



* The value of Guadaloupe has been eſtimated by the imports made from thence of ſugars during the time we poſſeſſed it. But no account has been made of

ſhould run of being ſoon engaged in a freſh quarrel, by the French and We proſecuting our different and oppoſite intereſts on that continent? And is all our paſt experience ſtill inſufficient to convince us of the impoſſibility that we ſhould ever agree in that quarter of the world; having both the ſame views, and both contending there for ſuperiority of dominion, as well as advancement of trade? We have already found ſince the peace, how difficult it is from the nature of the country, and the enemy we have to deal with, to ſubdue the Indians to meaſures of peace and accommodation, unſupported and uninfluenced by any thing but their own irregular and ſavage tempers.

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of the prodigious quantity of ſugars that were run from Martinico into Guadaloupe during all that time, as being the readieſt and only ſafe market the French could have, until the time that we took Martinico itſelf, which was in the cloſe of the war. So that the value of both iſlands have by this means been eſtimated, as the value of only one of them.

tempers. Had the French, agreeably to what is contained in the objection, been again put in poſſeſſion of Canada, it muſt have been infinitely more difficult, or rather abſolutely impracticable for us, to have reduced the Indians to any terms; whilſt ſupported, united and ſupplied, as they would have been in every thing, by all the power the art and induſtry of our rival. Nay, this very ſtep, now pleaded as a wiſer and better meaſure than what we have taken, had it been followed, would have been arraigned, and upon the cleareſt evidence condemned, as a betraying the intereſt of the nation, ſacrificing the end for which the war was undertaken, and giving away every true and real advantage obtained by our victories and the expence of ſo much blood and treaſure. This ſpirit of oppoſition would then indeed have contended, and with great propriety, that our peace had brought us no ſecurity: for ſuch a peace as they now recommend, would have ſown the ſeeds of eternal war and diſtreſs

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in North America. The Indian war would have been directed to harraſs intimidate and deſtroy our ſettlements. Theſe ſettlements, apt enough in their own nature to be turbulent and uneaſy under the reſtraints and limitations put upon them by the mother-country; would have had that turbulence inflamed by the emiſſaries of our rival: And when at any time they had carried their reſentment and diſreſpect towards the Britiſh legiſlature and government ſo far, as to dread her correction and chaſtiſement; the arms of France would have been ready to ſupport them in open defection and rebellion. Watching ſuch opportunities, prepared to improve them, it is not difficult to conceive the fatal conſequences in future times, not to our ſecurity only, but to the exiſtence of our dominion in that continent, ariſing from the power of France, reinforced by the Indians, and ſtrengthened by the defection of our own colonies.—As to the advantages that would have ariſen from the poſſeſſion of Guadaloupe, in furniſhing

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an additional market for the lumber and proviſions of North America; theſe advantages will be ſtill open. The French Weſt-India ſettlements ſtand in need of thoſe articles. Their intereſts compel them to apply to North America for them; and the Britiſh legiſlature will certainly encourage that trade, as far as it is conſiſtent with the general intereſt. But it appears at preſent to be a clear and uncontrovertible truth, that unleſs ſome proviſion can be made for lowering the duties ariſing from our ſugar iſlands, ſo as to put them upon ſome equality with the French ſugar iſlands; the furniſhing of lumber and proviſions to the latter, muſt neceſſarily put them in a capacity of underſelling the former at a foreign market, and conſequently in a courſe of time, of ruining this important article of our commerce. The double object therefore in view, is to encourage and enlarge as far as poſſible the North American trade, and at the ſame time to put our ſugar iſlands upon ſuch an equitable footing, as to

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enable them to vend their produce at a foreign market at leaſt as cheap, according to its quality, as the French. And unleſs the fretful partial and ſelfiſh ſpirit of party intervene, there is no doubt but that both theſe objects will be adjuſted, upon the beſt and wiſeſt principles, in the preſent ſeſſion of parliament.

It has been aſſerted, that the advantages ariſing from our acquiſitions in North America are very remote, not to ſay very uncertain; whereas thoſe proceeding from the poſſeſſion of the ſugar iſlands are immediate, and of the moſt ſubſtantial kind.

Had our anceſtors argued in this manner, and acted agreeably to this reaſoning; North America had certainly never received colonies from Great Britain: for the proſpect of ſucceſs was infinitely leſs certain at the time of their emigration, than the advantages to be derived from our new acquiſitions are to us now. But

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to argue from fact and experience.—I would beg leave to obſerve, that as our colonies have arrived at their preſent proſperous ſtate in leſs than a century, by the mere force of nature, and their own induſtry, and notwithſtanding the numberleſs obſtructions they have met with from the Indians and French, and the almoſt total neglect of the Britiſh government till very lately; it is ſelf-evident, that all theſe obſtructions being removed, by the Indians becoming our friends, the French being expelled, and the legiſlature of Great Britain taking theſe colonies immediately under its care, and promoting and encouraging the plantation of our new acquiſitions: they muſt continue to grow in numbers riches and commerce, in a much higher and greater proportion than at any given time before; and of conſequence, the emolument and benefit reſulting thence to Great Britain, muſt be in a much higher and greater degree than in any former period. The advantages therefore ariſing from our acquiſitions

in North America, are neither remote nor uncertain, but immediate and ſure. And as they are of a progreſſive nature, and will continue to augment and enlarge themſelves with time; they are for that very reaſon of the higher importance, and give a more fixed and durable proſpect of the dominion power and felicity of Great Britain. For as ſtates and empires, like individual mortals, grow up to a certain heighth, and then decline; ſo that empire which is ſtill growing and flouriſhing, but at the ſame time the longeſt in arriving at the meridian of its greatneſs, bids faireſt, in the courſe of nature, for duration and happineſs.—In this reſpect the empire of America may be ſaid to be the renovation of youth to the kingdom of Great Britain; already, when conſidered by herſelf, in an advanced age. I am infinitely far from undervaluing Guadaloupe; but when brought in competition with ſo grand an object as this, it becomes unworthy of being held in the leaſt degree of compariſon. Here

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then is a fund infinitely more large, more rich, and durable than Guadaloupe; and from theſe newly acquired poſſeſſions, and all the extenſive channels of commerce they lay open, being properly improved and duely attended to, we are to expect not only the means, along with our other reſources, of diſcharging the preſent public debt; but of being in a capacity of contracting upon occaſion a much larger one, and of ſupporting with vigour a much longer war. And although the French are permitted to exerciſe their former trade of the fiſhery near Newfoundland, and in ſome tracts of the gulph of St Laurence; yet, with every advantage on our ſide, it muſt be our fault alone, if ever they rival us in that branch of commerce.

I BEG leave then moſt humbly to conclude upon this head, that it was not the intereſt of Great Britain to continue the war: that as we could not exclude the French from the fiſh trade, and keep poſ-

ſeſſion of Guadaloupe Senegal and Goree, without continuing the war; it was directly and immediately the advantage and intereſt of Great Britain to conclude peace upon the honourable advantageous and enlarged terms the enemy agreed to: and that to have exchanged Canada, or any part of the enemy's former dominion in North America, for Guadaloupe; would have been moſt eſſentially hurtful and injurious to the nation, in its deareſt and greateſt intereſt.

It remains, that we conſider the merits of the two ſeveral negotiations, carried on in the reſpective years of 1761 and 1762.

The negotiation of 1761 had, on our ſide, two grand and principle objects in view. The firſt reſpected the intereſts of Great Britain in general, and as ſuch had the moſt direct and immediate relation to the motives and cauſes that gave riſe to the war. On which account "the intire

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" and total ceſſion of all Canada and its " dependencies; and of the iſland of " Cape Breton, and of the other iſlands " in the gulph and river of St Lau- " rence, [a]" were invariably and inflexibly inſiſted upon. The ſecond reſpected the moſt honourable and perfect accompliſh- ment of our engagements with the King of Pruſſia, and with this view it was de- clared, " That in caſe the ſeperate peace " between the two crowns ſhould be con- " cluded, His Majeſty would continue, " as an auxiliary, faithfully to aſſiſt the " King of Pruſſia, with efficacy and good " faith, in order to accompliſh the ſalutary " purpoſe of a general pacification in " Germany; and that it ſhould be free " to Great Britain and France, to ſupport, " as auxiliaries, their reſpective allies in " their particular conteſts for the recovery " of Sileſia, purſuant to the reſpective engage-

[a] *Vid.* The Anſwer of the Britiſh Court to the Ultimatum of the Court of France received the 1ſt of September 1761. Art. 1ſt.

" engagements which thoſe two crowns " have entered into. [b] "

THE court of France complied with the firſt of theſe objects, but inſiſted on the liberty of fiſhing and drying fiſh on the banks of Newfoundland, agreeably to the 13th article of the treaty of Utrecht; and on the liberty of fiſhing in all parts of the gulph of St Laurence, without landing on the coaſts, unleſs in caſe of accidents; and on the ceſſion of the iſlands St Pierre and Michelon for the accommodation of the French fiſhery, and for ſhelter to their fiſhing veſſels; ſtipulating at the ſame time, that there ſhould be no military eſtabliſhment, only a guard of 50 men to enforce the police: that no foreign veſſels ſhould land at thoſe iſlands; and that an Engliſh commiſſary ſhould be reſident in the ſaid iſland, to be witneſs to the

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[b] *Vid.* The Anſwer of the Britiſh Court to the Memorial of French Propoſitions, 29th July, 1761. Art. 13th.

the punctuality with which the ſtipulated condition of the treaty ſhould be obſerved [c]. The Britiſh court in her anſwer to the Ultimatum of France, had confined herſelf only to the ceſſion of St Pierre; and had ſtipulated not only for the reſidence of an Engliſh commiſſary, but that the commander of the Britiſh ſquadron at Newfoundland ſhould have a right from time to time to inſpect the ſaid iſle and port. Here the two courts, as far as related to the iſland Michelon and the inſpection of the Britiſh commander, differed to the laſt.

With regard to the ſecondary objects of their negotiation, the Britiſh court inſiſted, that "the town and port of Dunkirk ſhould be put in the condition it "ought to have been in by the laſt treaty "of Aix la Chapelle [d]". And the court of

[c] *Vid.* The laſt Memorial of France to England, 9th September 1761. Art. 4th.

[d] *Vid.* The Anſwer of the Britiſh Court to the Ultimatum of the Court of France, received the 1ſt of Sept. 1761.

of France agreed to " demoliſh the works " that had been made there for the de- " fence of the port ſince the beginning " of the war, to fill up the baſon which " contains the ſhips of war, and to deſtroy " the buildings belonging to the rope " yard; but that the trading port, which " would not receive a frigate, ſhould ſub- " ſiſt for the good of England as well as " for the benefit of France. That ſhe " would undertake not to ſuffer any ma- " ritime military eſtabliſhment in that " port; but that the cunette ſhould be " left ſtanding round the place for the ſa- " lubrity of the air and the health of the " inhabitants. [e] "—France was willing to evacuate the countries belonging to the Landgrave of Heſſe, the Duke of Brunſwick and the electorate of Hanover: [f] " And to reſtore to Great Britain the iſland of

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[e] *Vid.* The laſt Memorial of France to England, 9th Sept. 1761. Art. 4th.

[f] *Vid.* Ditto Art. 8. referring to the 7th Art. of the French Ultimatum.

" of Minorca, as likewiſe St Philip, in the " condition it ſtood, and with the artillery " therein, &c. at the time of taking the " ſaid iſland and fort. [g]"— The Britiſh court conſented to reſtore to France " the " iſlands Belle-iſle Guadaloupe and Ma- " rigalante, with the artillery, &c. which " was therein at the time of taking the " ſaid iſlands; [h]" but inſiſted " on an " equal partition of the neutral iſlands " Tobago St Lucia Dominica and St Vin- " cent, to be aſcertained in the future treaty " between the two crowns. [i]" And France " accepted of this partition, provided that " St Lucia was declared to make part of " the partition to be regulated in favour " of France. [k]"—The Britiſh court in-

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[g] *Vid.* The laſt Memorial of France to England, 9th Sept. 1761. Art. 6th.

[h] *Vid.* The Anſwer of the Britiſh Court to the Ultimatum of the Court of France, received the 1ſt of Sept. 1761. Art. 6th.

[i] *Vid.* Ditto Art. 5th.

[k] *Vid.* The laſt Memorial of France to England, &c. Art. 5th.

ſiſted on " the ceſſion of Senegal and its " dependencies as well as the iſland of " Goree in the moſt ample manner; but " declared, that if the court of France " would ſuggeſt any reaſonable expedient " to provide themſelves with negroes that " might not be too detrimental to the " Britiſh ſubjects in Africa, the King " would willingly enter upon a diſcuſſion " of this ſubject.[l]" And the French court was " willing to guaranty the poſ- " ſeſſion of Senegal and Goree to England, " provided England on her part would " guaranty the poſſeſſion of the ſettle- " ments of Anamaboo and Akra on the " coaſt of Africa.[m]"—As to the Eaſt Indies, the court of England was of opinion, that " it muſt neceſſarily be left to the " companies of the two nations to adjuſt " the terms of accommodation and recon- " ciliation.

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[l] *Vid.* The Anſwer of the Britiſh Court to the Ultimatum of France, &c. Art 3d.

[m] *Vid.* The laſt Memorial of France to England, &c. Art 3d.

" ciliation. [n] " And the court of France " adopted this negotiation between the " East India companies of the two nations, " on condition that the negotiation ſhould " be concluded at the ſame time with that " between the two crowns. [o] " The articles reſpecting the ceſſion of hoſtilities and the exchange of priſoners admitted of no heſitation or doubt on either ſide.

So far the two crowns ſeemed to be approaching towards one anothers ideas of peace as relative to themſelves and reſpecting one anothers dominions. There was only one great point in which they totally differed from beginning to end, and that was with regard to the captures made after the commencement of hoſtilities and before the declaration of war. The court of France inſiſted, that " thoſe



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[n] *Vid.* The Anſwer of the Britiſh Court to the Ultimatum of France, &c. Art. 13th.

[o] *Vid.* The laſt Memorial of France to England, &c. Art. 13th.

" captures, not including the King's " ſhips, were objects of legal reſtitu- " tion. [p]" The court of England was of opinion, " that ſuch a demand, on " the part of France, was neither juſt nor " maintainable according to the moſt in- " conteſtible principles of the right of " war and of nations. [q]" France adhered to his demand of reſtitution; [r] and both Sovereigns remained inflexible on this point.

In purſuance of the ſecond grand object the Britiſh court inſiſted, that " France " ſhould reſtore and evacuate Weſel and " all the places and territories belonging " to the King of Pruſſia in poſſeſſion of the

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[p] *Vid.* The French Memorial of the 15th July 1761, Art. 12th. And the French Ultimatum of the 5th of Auguſt 1761. Art. 10th.

[q] *Vid.* The Anſwer of the Britiſh Court to the Ultimatum of France, &c. Art. 10th.

[r] *Vid.* The laſt Memorial of France to England, &c. Art. 10th.

" the arms of France: [s] And that Oſtend
" and Newport ſhould alſo be evacuated
" without delay by the French gariſons. ' "
The court of France maintained, that
" as to what concerned Weſel Guelders
" and other countries in Weſtphalia be-
" longing to the King of Pruſſia, which
" were actually in poſſeſſion of the Em-
" preſs Queen, the King could not ſtipu-
" late to ſurrender the conqueſts of his
" allies: [u] And as to " Oſtend and New-
" port, he had only lent his forces to his
" ally to ſecure thoſe places, and that his
" in-

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[s] *Vid.* The Anſwer of the Britiſh Court to the Memorial of French Propoſitions, the 29th July 1761, being the Ultimatum of England, Art. 7th. And the Anſwer of the Britiſh Court to the Ultimatum of France, Art. 8th.

[t] *Vid.* Ditto Anſwer of the Britiſh Court to the Memorial of French Propoſitions, &c. Art. 11th. And Ditto Anſwer of the Britiſh Court to the Ultimatum of France, &c. Art. 11th.

[u] *Vid.* The Ultimatum of France, the 5th of Aug. 1761. Art. 7th. And the laſt Memorial of France, &c. Art. 8th.

" intention never was to keep poſſeſſion " of them after the eſtabliſhment of " peace. [x] "—Both Kings continued equally intent upon the ſupport of their allies throughout the whole of the negotiation. France indeed propoſed, that " he would grant no ſuccour of any kind " to his allies for the continuance of the " war againſt the King of Pruſſia, if His " Britannick Majeſty would enter into the " like agreement with reſpect to that " Monarch; and obſerved, that the pro- " poſition of leaving France at liberty to " ſend forces into Silefia, was unfavour- " able, from particular circumſtances, to " the Empreſs, and conſequently inad- " miſſible. [y] " Great Britain replied with energy, that " His Majeſty remained in " the ſame inflexible reſolution which he " de-

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[x] *Vid.* Ditto Ultimatum of France, &c. Art. 11th. And ditto laſt Memorial of France, Art. 11th.

[y] *Vid.* Ditto Ultimatum of France, &c. Art. 13th. And ditto laſt Memorial of France, &c. Art. 9th.

" declared at the firſt overture of the
" preſent negotiation, never to deſiſt from
" giving conſtant ſuccour to the King of
" Pruſſia, as an auxiliary, with efficacy
" and good faith, in order to attain the
" ſalutary end of a general pacification in
" Germany. With this view His Ma-
" jeſty, far from propoſing to leave France
" at liberty to ſend armies into Sileſia,
" without being limited to the number
" ſtipulated in her actual engagements
" with the court of Vienna, (a circum-
" ſtance not to be found in any part of
" the Ultimatum of England) had uni-
" formly declared, as the 13th article of
" the ſaid Ultimatum profeſſes, that Great
" Britain and France ſhould be at liberty
" to ſupport their reſpective allies as auxi-
" liaries in their particular conteſt for the
" recovery of Sileſia, according to the en-
" gagements entered into by each crown.[z]"

THE

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[z] *Vid.* Anſwer of the Britiſh Court to the Ultimatum of France, &c. Art. 9th.

THE interpoſition of the court of Spain, and the manner of that interpoſition in behalf of France, in the courſe of this negotiation, had not only diſguſted the Britiſh court, but filled the Britiſh miniſter with the juſteſt and beſt founded ſuſpicions of the ſincerity of France, and of her intentions of playing an after-game, by introducing Spain into a ſhare of the war as her intimate confederate and ally; and theſe ſuſpicions becoming more manifeſt and plain about the time that France emitted his laſt memorial, they put a final period to any further correſpondence between the two courts. The Spaniſh war enſued, and all ſides reſted their hopes once more on the ſucceſs of their arms.

MR P—'s conduct in all this buſineſs expreſſed the higheſt juſtice moderation and fortitude. He ſecured and indemnified Great Britain, as far as he could, by the acquiſition of Canada, its dependencies, and the advantages attending the

the dominion of the gulph and river of St Laurence. He ſhewed a worthy and laudable moderation in the ceſſions that he made in favour of France. And it was not only fit, but indiſpenſably neceſſary at that time, both for the honour of the nation and for the general intereſt of Europe, which was then ſtaked upon the fate of Pruſſia, to manifeſt and prove to the world the moſt inflexible ſpirited and heroic attachment to his cauſe and intereſt. The King of Pruſſia was then in the moſt deſperate ſituation, and the ballance of Europe as well as the proteſtant intereſt was on the brink of ruin; ſo that if ever the continent merited our attention, it merited it now in the higheſt degree.

The negociation of 1762 had, on our ſide, like that of the preceeding year, two grand and principal objects in view. The firſt was the ſame that had been purſued in the former conferences, and had reſpect to the intereſts of Great Britain as im-

mediately connected with the motives and cauſes of the war and other intereſts of an inferior degree. The other had relation to the King and kingdom of Portugal, who were both in the moſt imminent danger of being conquered and overrun by the united forces of France and Spain; and this intirely upon our account: at the ſame time, it kept ſtill in view the King of Pruſſia and the general intereſt of Europe. The higheſt principles of honour and good faith, as well as the ſtrongeſt inducements of commercial intereſt, excited and juſtified us in this conduct. The King of Portugal was now what the King of Pruſſia had been laſt year, at the brink of ruin and deſolation. To have ſupported the King of Pruſſia, now in the current of proſperity and victory, in the ſame manner and with the ſame firmneſs that we had done in the former negotiation, when in the heighth of diſtreſs; would have been to inflame and perpetuate the miſeries of Germany, and to endanger more than

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ever that very ballance of Europe that we have all along wanted ſo much to uphold. Not to have ſupported the King of Portugal, would have been not only a groſs breach of faith and honour; but the moſt fooliſh and unpardonable ſacrifice of our commerce and trade. Having ſo far explained this change of objects, we will now proceed to examine the merits of this laſt negotiation which ended in the treaty of peace.

By the negotiation of 1761, the Britiſh dominions in America were greatly extended; and, as already obſerved, ſecured as far as they could be at that time. But by the line of limitation then deſcribed through the lakes, ſuperior Huron, and Michigan, and the rivers Onabach and Ohio, to the influx of the latter into the Miſſiſippi; many Indian nations occupied very extenſive dominions between the two belligerant powers, who were to be under the protection of the two crowns, according to their ſituation on this or that

ſide of limitation. Beyond theſe nations and comprehending part of them, lay an immenſe country on both ſides the river Miſſiſippi, claimed and appertaining to the enemy under the general name of Louſiana. He likewiſe poſſeſſed both ſides of the Miſſiſippi, and the Mobile, down to their influx into the gulf of Mexico; and to the eaſt and ſouth eaſt of this laſt termination lay Florida, belonging to and occupied by the crown of Spain. Theſe vaſt countries lying from north to eaſt and ſouth eaſt of the Miſſiſippi, compoſed not only a region far more fair promiſing and prolific than that of Canada; but by their continuity and intermixture not only with the countries of the Indians adjoining, but with our dominions and back ſettlements, gave the French the ſame eaſy opportunity on this ſide, as they had formerly enjoyed on that of Canada, to harraſs impede and endanger our colonies by means of the Indians and their own ardent ſpirit of innovation. In the interval between the breaking off of the laſt and the

final termination of the preſent negotiation, His Majeſty's arms had brought two important acquiſitions into the ſcale of Great Britain, namely, the conqueſt of the iſland of Martinico, [a] and that alſo of the town and port of the Havana. [b] The reduction of Manila, one of the Philippine iſlands, happened about the ſame time; [c] but had no conſequence whatever in the negotiation, as not being known till long after the peace was concluded. Theſe acquiſitions then of Martinico and the Havana preſented an opportunity of amplifying our poſſeſſions, and compleating our ſecurity and indemnification on the continent, agreeably to the original ideas and motives of the war, by exchanging our new conqueſts for American territory; or, by inſiſting on the uti poſſidetis, to keep poſſeſſion of one or more of the conquered iſlands, and thereby enlarge our

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[a] Martinico ſubdued 14th February 1762.
[b] The Havana ſubdued 13th Auguſt ſame year.
[c] Manila ſubdued 6th October ſame year.

our ſugar trade. The advantages of the latter were certain and immediately to be felt. The advantages of the former were no leſs certain, and tho' incomparably more important, were not ſo obvious, as they cannot be enjoyed in all their extent till a future age. This circumſtance is ſufficient to explain how impoſſible it was to proceed upon either plan without being liable to objections, according to the narrow or enlarged view in which the ſyſtem of the national intereſt may be conſidered. For had the Britiſh court acted by the plan now recommended by the partiſans of oppoſition, and ſuffering themſelves to have been blinded by the advantages ariſing from the ſugar trade, neglected our more eſſential intereſts of North America; we might then have heard, That the negociators of this peace had given away every advantage and ſecurity for which the war was undertaken, and which by the war we had obtained. That the ſugar iſlands, altho' they promoted the trade and riches of the kingdom, rather diminiſhed than

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increaſed its real ſtrentgth. That attending to the intereſts of North America would have been to have ſecured the ſtrength and power of the nation upon ſolid foundations, that of the increaſe and cultivation of the human ſpecies, not only in itſelf the nobleſt work of government, but by adding ſo many ſubjects to the ſtate, would have aggrandized and confirmed its power. That nothing but the ſuperlative ignorance of our miniſters could have prefered the advantages ariſing from the ſugar iſlands to the much more extenſive and durable advantages to be derived from the ſecure poſſeſſion and improvement of North America: advantages in themſelves obvious and demonſtrable from all our paſt and preſent experience of the benefits ariſing to Great Britain from the proſperity of our ſettlements already eſtabliſhed there, altho' they had been carried on under every kind of difficulty. That their malevolence and treachery, as well as ignorance, had induced them, in reſentment to the man

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who had been the life and ſoul of all our victories, to depart from his judicious plan; and admitting the enemy again into their vanquiſhed poſſeſſions of America, blaſted all the fair fruits of the war, and rendered our dominion trade, and even exiſtence, in that region of the world, more precarious than ever. And what would have been worſt of all, theſe complaints and objections would have not only had the warm approbation of popularity; but, on the ſtricteſt ſcrutiny, truth and reaſon for their ſupport.—If we add to this ground of difference in opinion, all the force and weight of party, which to the peculiar misfortune of this kingdom ſubſiſted at that time in a very high degree; all the private animoſity, partial views, and intereſted conduct, that exerts itſelf in that contracted circle under the maſk of public utility and patriot affection: we ſhall then be able very eaſily to account to ourſelves for all the virulent abuſe, and violent outrage, that has been practiſed by both ſides, to the diſgrace of

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the preſent age, upon this ſubject; and be convinced how expedient it is to ſeperate ourſelves from popular credulity and party rage, as well as from the alluring authority and glare of a court, to judge with propriety and clearneſs upon this matter; ſince act which way ſoever the miniſtry would, they could not poſſibly have avoided, in the preſent ſpirit of the times, what has happened.

The plan of pacification in 1761, ſo far as both courts had approached towards one anothers ideas, was adopted by the Britiſh miniſtry as the foundation of the preſent negotiation. This not only facilitated the work of peace, but the ceſſions therein agreed to had been obtained with ſo much difficulty and altercation, notwithſtanding all the vigour reſolution and extenſive genius of the Britiſh miniſter at that time, that to have rejected it and gone on upon a new ſyſtem, would have been opening ſuch a wide field of diſpute and diſcuſſions, and of incompatible in-

tereſts and prejudices, as muſt have capitally embaraſſed and obſtructed the negotiation from the beginning. The intimate connection this plan had with the intereſt of the nation, with the public and univerſal ſentiment of the kingdom before and after the commencement of the war, and with the motives and cauſes that had given riſe to it, recommended it likewiſe, as the moſt perfect ſyſtem that could be laid down. A happy coincidence of ideas in the two courts rendered this plan the more practicable in its execution: for the victories we had every where obtained, had diverted France from his ardent deſire of dominion in North America, and confined his views ſolely to the recovery of his ſettlements in the Weſt Indies, and the retaining of the liberty of fiſhing at Newfoundland; and theſe very conqueſts had inſpired in the Britiſh court the deſire of compleating perfecting and ſecuring their dominion in America, as an object of the firſt and greateſt national conſideration and conſequence. Agreeably to theſe prin-

principles and views, Martinico was given back to France[d], and the Havana to Spain[e]. In compenſation for which, France "intirely abandoned all the In-" dian nations, and gave up all his ex-" tenſive claims and poſſeſſions of do-" minion on the left ſide of the river St " Laurence, including Mobille." He fixed certain clear and indiſputable boundaries and barriers between the dominions of the two nations "by a line drawn from " the ſource of the Miſſiſippi, along the " middle of that river, to the river Iber-" ville; and from thence along the middle " of that river, and the lakes Maurepas " and Pontchartrain, to the ſea." And he gave up to us, at the ſame time, "the " free navigation of the river Miſſiſippi in " its full breadth and length.[f]" Spain likewiſe ceded "Florida, with fort St " Auguſtine, and the bay of Penſacola; " as well as all that Spain poſſeſſes on the



[d] Treaty of Peace, Art 8th.—[e] Ditto, Art 19th.
[f] Ditto, Art 7th.

" continent of North America, eaſt or to " the ſouth eaſt of the river Miſſiſippi. [s]" Theſe ceſſions and boundaries we may now venture to affirm, after having already ſo fully made out their utility and importance, were the moſt admirable and invaluable acquiſitions, and the higheſt improvement of what had been ceded and agreed by the former negociation reſpecting our ſecurity, and all the future trade power and riches to be derived from our American empire, that could have been expected or thought of; for the ceſſions made, and all the points ſettled by that negociation relative to this country, were wholly inſecure precarious and unſatisfactory without them.

In reſpect to the neutral iſlands, which by the former negociation were to have been equally divided between the two crowns, with this determined proviſo on the part of France, that St Lucia ſhould make

[s] Treaty of Peace, Art 20th.

make part of the partition to be regulated in his favour[h]; three of them, viz St Vincent Dominica and Tobago, were by this negotiation declared to remain in full right to Great Britain, and only St Lucia to be delivered to France[i]. Beſide theſe, France likewiſe ceded and guarantied to His Majeſty in full right, the iſlands of Grenada and the Grenadines[k]. From this ſimple narration of facts it is ſelf-evident how much the condition agreed to by the former negotiation concerning theſe neutral iſlands, is bettered and improved by the condition ſtipulated in this. In place of two, we have three of them; and in place of the fourth, we have the Grenades and the Grenadines. It is likewiſe evident what great attention was given to the improvement of our ſugar colonies and the Weſt-India trade, after having compleated and ſecured our firſt and

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[h] *Vid.* The laſt Memorial of France to England, 9th September 1761, Art 5th.

[i] Treaty of Peace, Art 9th.—[k] Ditto, Art 9th

and grand object on the continent of America. The value and importance of these acquisitions are already in part known, notwithstanding the indefatigable art and labour that has been practised to depreciate them. The large purchases that have already been made in the Grenades, and the extensive importations from thence, have opened the eyes even of the strongest prejudice. The island Tobago we know to be fruitful, and much more extensive than any other of the neutral islands. Our settlements there formerly were rendered precarious and even untenable, from the attacks made upon the settlers by the Indians; whereas now that it is fully and intirely in our possession, that the crown has taken it under protection, and that its contiguity to the Grenades affords the means of aid and assistance; we have the fairest prospect of its future importance in commerce. St Lucia would have been highly advantageous to us, by its having an excellent port; in other respects it is as yet uncultivated. But our possession

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of it, conſidering its very near ſituation to Martinico, would have been ſowing the ſeeds of eternal diſſention and animoſity between the two crowns: And this inconvenience taken along with the conſiderable and immediate commercial advantages ariſing from our poſſeſſion of the Grenades, and all the other neutral iſlands, will ſufficiently ſatisfy any fair and unbiaſſed enquirer, of the expediency and wiſdom of relinquiſhing it; as nothing ought more ſtrictly to be attended to, in making a laſting and ſolid peace, than to avoid and prevent every occaſion that may give riſe to future miſunderſtandings and diſputes.

To cede to France the iſland of St Pierre, under the condition of an Engliſh commiſſary to reſide there, and the commander of the Britiſh ſquadron to viſit it at pleaſure; were rather terms of mortification and puniſhment, than that we ſtood in need of any ſuch ſecurity. Reflecting upon the hoſtages demanded and given at the

the peace of Aix la Chapelle, it was a juſt retribution for that affront. But as the Britiſh court at that time was more to blame for ſubmitting to it, than even the French were for impoſing it; ſo, at this time, when we had acquired ſuch vaſt acquiſitions and advantages, it was the beſt and wiſeſt policy to conclude a peace without any, or with as few perſonal or national affronts as poſſible; as theſe of all other things wound the natural pride and honour of a people moſt, and by that means render the peace ſo concluded, inſupportable and inſincere. There is indeed no reaſon to imagine, that had the two courts been in good humour during the former negotiation, and had they been agreed in the higher and more important objects of the peace, that theſe terms would have been at all inſiſted upon; but there having been in all probability a deſign diſcovered to overreach on the one ſide, that no doubt might occaſion a juſt indignation and inflexibility, even in the ſmalleſt matters, on the other. To re-

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move theſe obſtructions, the preſent negotiation granted to France the little iſland of Michelon along with St Pierre; and ſoothed his honour, by deſiſting from the impoſition of a reſident commiſſary, and the viſitations of the Britiſh commander of a ſquadron. In return for which, France agreed to reſtrict the liberty of his fiſhing within narrower bounds; and, as formerly, engaged not to raiſe any fortifications, or erect any buildings, but merely for the fiſhery; and to keep only a guard of fifty men for the police[1]. By this adjuſtment we clearly acquired a large and excluſive fiſhery, and ſecured the limits of our wide extended coaſts and ſhores with much more certainty from the landing and viſitation of the French, than by the former negotiation. For by the 5th article of the treaty of peace, " the ſubjects of the " moſt chriſtian King have leave to fiſh in " the gulph of St Laurence, on condition " that they do not exerciſe the ſaid fiſhery



[1] Treaty of Peace, Art 6th.

" but at the diſtance of three leagues " from all the coaſts belonging to Great " Britain, as well thoſe of the continent " as thoſe of the iſlands ſituated in the " ſaid gulph of St Laurence. And as to " the fiſhery on the coaſts of the iſland " Cape-Breton, the ſubjects of the moſt " chriſtian King ſhall not be permitted to " exerciſe the ſaid fiſhery but at the diſ- " tance of fifteen leagues from the coaſts " of the iſland Cape-Breton." It has been objected to this article, that it is illuſory and eaſily to be evaded, from the difficulty of determining, in the ſea, the exact diſtances prohibited. But this objection can only be of weight with thoſe who are prejudiced and biaſſed to believe every thing on one ſide, and to admit nothing as right on the other: for matters in this caſe are as eaſily to be determined, as the limits and boundaries at ſea of neutral powers, within which no captures can be made; for where any controverſy ariſes on this head, the preparatory examinations, and the courſe of evidence on the ſide of the

the captors, and on the ſide of the captivated, along with the collateral circumſtances relating to the behaviour of the captivated at the time of the chace, and at the time when taken; afford as clear and certain means of determining in ſuch matters, as in any general caſes that happen in the courſe of a war.

The cunette of Dunkirk was agreed to be deſtroyed, immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of the preſent treaty [m]; a point which, tho' inflexibly inſiſted upon in the former negotiation, was moſt tenaciouſly refuſed by France from the beginning to the end of it. [n]

In the former negociation France had inſiſted upon having Senegal, or Goree, reſtored. The Britiſh court perſiſted on the ceſſion of both in the moſt ample manner; but declared at the ſame time,



[m] Treaty of Peace, Art 13th.

[n] *Vid.* The laſt Memorial of France to England, 9th September 1761. Art. 4th.

" that if the court of France would
" ſuggeſt any reaſonable expedient to
" provide themſelves with negroes that
" might not be too detrimental to the
" intereſts of the Britiſh ſubjects in Africa,
" His Majeſty would willingly enter upon
" a diſcuſſion of this ſubject. [o]" France replied, " that the King was willing to
" guaranty the poſſeſſion of Senegal and
" Goree to the crown of England, pro-
" vided England would guaranty the poſ-
" ſeſſion of the ſettlements of Anamaboo
" and Akra, on the coaſt of Africa. [p]"
It is evident from theſe approaches the two courts made towards one another upon this head, notwithſtanding their ill humour, that had they been agreed in the more eſſential point, this would have made no difference between them. Accordingly, upon this laſt negociation, the Britiſh court reſtored the barren rock of Goree to France,

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[o] *Vid.* The Anſwer of the Britiſh Court to the Ultimatum of France, &c. Art 3.

[p] *Vid.* The laſt Memorial of France, &c. Art. 3.

France, as an expedient to provide herſelf with negroes, and the leaſt deſtructive one to the intereſts of the Britiſh ſubjects in Africa, all whoſe ſettlements were intirely preſerved and ſecured, and the valuable ſettlement of Senegal added to them. [q]

In the negociation of 1761 the affairs of the Eaſt Indies were totally unadjuſted, and agreed to be remitted to the mutual altercations and diſcuſſions of the two companies. [r] In that of 1762, the Britiſh miniſtry referred to our own Eaſt India company what related to that quarter of the world; and when that company had committed a capital error with reſpect to the ſtipulations agreed to in the preliminaries, rectified compleatly in the treaty of peace: by which it is ſtipulated, that "Great Britain ſhall reſtore to France, "in

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[q] Treaty of Peace, Art 10th.

[r] *Vid.* The Anſwer of the Britiſh Court to the Ultimatum of the Court of France, Art 13th. And the laſt Memorial of France to England, 9th Sept. 1761, Art 13th.

" in the condition they are now in, the
" different factories which that crown
" poſſeſſed, as well on the coaſt of Coro-
" mandel and Orixa, as in that of Mala-
" bar, as alſo in Bengal, at the beginning
" of the year 1749. And His moſt
" chriſtian Majeſty renounces all preten-
" ſions to the acquiſition which he had
" made on the coaſt of Coromandel and
" Orixa, ſince the ſaid beginning of the
" year 1749. His moſt chriſtian Majeſty
" ſhall reſtore, on his ſide, all that he
" may have conquered from Great Britain
" in the Eaſt Indies during the preſent
" war; and will expreſsly cauſe Nattal
" and Tapanoully in the iſland of Sumatra
" to be reſtored; He engages further, not
" to erect fortifications, or to keep troops
" in any part of the dominions of the
" Subah of Bengal; and in order to pre-
" ſerve future peace on the coaſt of Coro-
" mandel and Orixa, the Engliſh and
" French ſhall acknowledge Mahomet
" Ally Khan for lawful Nabob of the
" Carnatick, and Salabat Jing for lawful
" Subah

" Subah of the Decan, &c. [s] " The condition in which the French factories were reſtored, was with their fortification and defences wholly and entirely demoliſhed: and whilſt a becoming and commendable moderation was ſhewn in reſtoring to that crown his former poſſeſſions there, a moſt prudent and laudable precaution was taken for removing future danger to ourſelves from his neighbourhood, by depriving him of fortifications and troops in the dominions of Bengal, and bringing him to acknowledge the ſame Subahs that we acknowledged. Half a century at leaſt, without theſe precautions, would have reſtored the French to their former proſperity and importance; and with all theſe precautions taken and advantages on our ſide, it will be our fault certainly, if ever they rival us there again.

THE court of France had moſt inflexibly perſiſted, in every part of the former

[s] Treaty of Peace, Art 11th.

former negotiation, that " the captures " made at ſea by England before the de- " claration of war, were objects of legal " reſtitution; and as ſuch, challenged the " right of nations, that ſome expedient " might be agreed upon in the treaty as a " recompence for them. [t] " In this negociation he deſiſted from every part of this very extenſive demand, and gave up the whole controverſy.

In 1761, no proviſion whatever had been made for the reimburſement of the expences incurred by the maintenance of the priſoners of war, which amounted to a very important ſum in our favour. In 1762, the treaty of peace ſtipulates, that " each crown reſpectively ſhall pay the " advances which ſhall have been made " for the ſubſiſtence and maintenance of " theſe priſoners, by the ſovereign of the " country where they ſhall have been detained:

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[t] *Vid.* The laſt Memorial of France to England, &c. Art 10th.

" detained: and ſecurities ſhall be reci-
" procally given for the payment of the
" debts which the priſoners ſhall have
" contracted in the countries where they
" have been detained, until their intire
" liberty. [u] "

In the firſt negociation, the Canadian bills due by the crown of France had made no part of the deliberations. In the laſt, by the treaty of peace, " His " moſt chriſtian Majeſty declares, that " they ſhall be punctually paid, agreeable " to the liquidation made, in a convenient " time, according to the diſtance of the " places and to what ſhall be poſſible. [x] "

Thus far the merits of the peace as reſpecting its firſt grand object, have been conſidered in a comparative view with

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[u] Treaty of Peace, Art 3d.

[x] Declaration of His moſt chriſtian Majeſty's Plenipotentiary with regard to the debts due to the Canadians.

the negociation of 1761; and as reſpecting the intereſts of Great Britain, connected with the motives and cauſes of the war; and other intereſts of an inferior degree.

The ſecond grand object was, the King and kingdom of Portugal; yet ſtill keeping ſight of the King of Pruſſia, and the general intereſt of Europe. Our firm attachment to the King of Pruſſia was founded and juſtified upon the combined aſſociation againſt him of the powers of Auſtria Germany Ruſſia France Sweden and Saxony, by which the proteſtant intereſt, the liberties of Germany, and the ballance of Europe were in the laſt and moſt imminent danger. In 1761, he was almoſt ſtript of all his dominions; and heaven and his good fortune ſeemed finally to abandon him. In this deſperate ſituation of his affairs Great Britain was his only ally, and the Britiſh court, during the negotiation of that year, ſtood immoveably fixed in his intereſt, and determined

termined to ſupport him with efficacy and vigour in his laſt extremities. In 1762 his good fortune again returned to him; and heaven becoming propitious, cleared the ſky, diſpelled the ſtorm, and elevated him once more to the ſummit of victory conqueſt and glory! His implacable enemy, the Empreſs Elizabeth, died. The Czar, Peter the Third, ſucceeded her. Ruſſia then became his friend; generouſly reſtored him all the great and important acquiſitions that had been made upon him in that quarter; and even aſſiſted him with an army to contend with the reſt of the confederates. Peter was ſoon taken off. The preſent Empreſs Catharine ſeized on the reins of government: and tho' ſhe recalled the Ruſſian troops, ſhe nevertheleſs adhered ſtrictly to the treaty of peace which her huſband had made with Pruſſia, and faithfully evacuated all the Ruſſian conqueſts. The Britiſh miniſter at Peterſburg employed all the influence of the Britiſh court there, with indefatigable addreſs,

in ſupport of all theſe favourable events. Sweden had early followed the example of the Czar Peter, in entering into terms of accommodation with the court of Berlin. In the midſt of this auſpicious turn of fortune in Germany, the negociation was opened and carried on between Great Britain and France. The Britiſh court now ſaw Ruſſia, the moſt powerful member of that moſt threatning and formidable alliance which had combined for the deſtruction of Pruſſia, taken off and united with him in friendſhip. Sweden had likewiſe become his friend. Saxony was ruined and without all power to hurt. The arms together with the genius of the Pruſſian Monarch were an overmatch for thoſe of the houſe of Auſtria. Europe demanded peace. The moſt eſſential intereſts of Great Britain required it. The end for which the German war was undertaken, was anſwered. Pruſſia was reinſtated in all his royal dominions, and maſter of Sileſia. In order therefore that he might make peace, and

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ſecure himſelf with the greateſt advantage, it was only neceſſary to take off France from giving any further aid or aſſiſtance to Auſtria; and for that purpoſe it was ſtipulated, " that France ſhould evacuate " Cleves Weſel Guelders, and all the do- " minions belonging to the King of " Pruſſia; that the armies of both crowns " ſhould evacuate the countries they oc- " cupied in Weſtphalia, lower Saxony, on " the lower Rhine, the upper Rhine, and " all the empire, and retreat into the do- " minions of their reſpective ſovereigns. " And both crowns engaged and pro- " miſed to each other not to furniſh any " ſuccours of any kind, to their reſpective " allies, who ſhould continue engaged in " the war in Germany.[y]" For the court of London to have continued the war at this time, would have been to have ſacri- ficed all the intereſt of Great Britain, in order to give the King of Pruſſia a chance of becoming a conqueror. To conclude peace

[y] Treaty of Peace, Art 15th.

peace with France, and take off that powerful and only remaining ally of the houſe of Auſtria, was to ſecond Pruſſia's good fortune, and place him in a road of victory, which muſt lead him to the moſt equitable fair and advantageous peace, and ſecure all the ends for which the war was undertaken. It was indeed to do him a much greater ſervice, than to have continued the war, and by that means kept France attached to Auſtria. For the French were always greatly ſuperior to us in their number of troops; and all that we could do, even with the abilities of a general infinitely ſuperior to all thoſe of the enemy, was only to maintain a defenſive war, without giving actual and effective aſſiſtance to our ally. But by agreeing at this time to the propoſitions of France, and leaving Pruſſia and Auſtria to themſelves, we took off the weight of France from the ſcale of Auſtria; and by diſbanding our armies in Germany, threw an actual and moſt valuable ſupply of veteran ſoldiers, with one of the beſt and moſt

moſt fortunate generals in Europe, into the ſcale of Pruſſia, ſhould he find it neceſſary for obtaining his purpoſes to purſue his conqueſts. Having thus yielded to the propoſitions of France, and in yielding opened the way for the King of Pruſſia to a ſecure and advantageous peace; the court of London remained firm and inflexibly fixed upon the ſalvation of the King and kingdom of Portugal. Here was an ally that of himſelf could not have ſtood a moment before the united force of his enemies. His kingdom actually attacked; whole provinces giving way; and his ſeat of government ready to be overturned: what object ſo worthy and noble as this for the exerciſe of the good faith, magnanimity, and heroiſm of Great Britain! We had ſent a handful of troops to his aſſiſtance. They behaved with a ſpirit gallantry and eclat, worthy of their country; but they were wholly inſufficient to ward off the fatal calamity, and we wholly unable to afford greater and freſh ſupplies. Here in a moſt diſtinguiſhed

manner

manner appeared the effects of our naval conqueſts of 1762; and the fortitude of the Britiſh court in being now as firm and immoveable in the cauſe of Portugal, as formerly on a like occaſion in the cauſe of Pruſſia. France and Spain yielded in their turn to our propoſitions, and reſtored the King of Portugal to the full ſovereignty and poſſeſſion of all his dominions, as well in Europe, as in America Africa and the Eaſt Indies. [z]

Thus far the merits of the peace in its ſecond grand object have been conſidered; and we ſee how both in the one and the other, it had a direct or collateral relation to the negociation of 1761, and how much it enlarged and improved that plan. But it likewiſe took in and adjuſted a new object, which had reſpect to the differences ſubſiſting between the crowns of Great Britain and Spain; which had been rejected with great propriety in the

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[z] Treaty of Peace, Art 21ſt.

the former conferences with France, because of the manner in which it had been obtruded.

THESE differences consisted of three particulars, in which Spain demanded

1st, The restitution of some captures, which had been made upon the Spanish flag during the present war.

2d, The privilege of the Spanish nation, to fish upon the banks of Newfoundland.

3d, The demolition of the English settlements, made upon the Spanish territories in the bay of Honduras.

THE first respecting the prizes was referred to the courts of justice of the admiralty of Great Britain. [a]

AND as to the second, which respects the fishery, " His most catholic Majesty " desists, as well for himself, as for his



[a] Treaty of Peace, Art 16th.

" ſucceſſors, from all pretenſions which
" he may have formed, in favour of the
" Guipuſcoans, and other his ſubjects, to
" the right of fiſhing in the neighbour-
" hood of the iſland of Newfoundland. [b] "

And as to the third, reſpecting Honduras,
" His Britannick Majeſty ſhall cauſe to be
" demoliſhed all the fortifications which
" his ſubjects ſhall have erected in the
" bay of Honduras, and other places in
" the territory of Spain in that part of
" the world, four months after the rati-
" fication of the preſent treaty; and His
" catholic Majeſty ſhall not permit His
" Britannick Majeſty's ſubjects, or their
" workmen, to be diſturbed, or moleſted,
" under any pretence whatſoever, in the
" ſaid places, in their occupation of cutt-
" ing, loading and carrying away log-
" wood: and for this purpoſe, they may
" build without hindrance, and occupy
" without interruption, the houſes and
" maga-

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[b] Treaty of Peace, Art 18th

" magazines which are neceſſary for them,
" for their families, and for their effects;
" and His catholic Majeſty aſſures to
" them, by this article, the full enjoy-
" ment of thoſe advantages, and powers,
" on the Spaniſh coaſts and territories, as
" above ſtipulated, immediately after the
" ratification of the preſent treaty [c]."

THESE adjuſtments of the Spaniſh demands exactly agree with what the Britiſh court voluntarily offered to the court of Spain in the inſtructions tranſmitted by Mr P— at London to Lord B—— at Madrid, under the 28th of July 1761, immediately after the French court had been repulſed in their attempts to introduce the complaints of Spain as a part of their negociation, and His catholic Majeſty as the guarantee of the treaty. This circumſtance, whilſt it proves the propriety and equity of the Britiſh miniſter's conduct at that time, and the folly and



[c] Treaty of Peace, Art 17th.

injuſtice of the Spaniſh court in commencing a war for what they readily gave up in every point at making peace; ſhews likewiſe the incoherence inconſiſtency and virulence of the ſpirit of party, in the objections that have been thrown out to this part of the peace. For it has been contended and inſiſted upon, that we had a right to the poſſeſſion of the bay of Honduras; and that the forts erected there were our ſecurity; and by giving up thoſe forts, and admitting the Spaniſh claim to the right of poſſeſſion of the bay of Honduras, we remain now without any ſecurity, and depend intirely on the good will and ſufferance of that nation for our logwood trade. Now, admitting this objection, for arguments ſake only, in its full ſtrength; it would not be the folly or fault of the miniſter in 1762, but of the miniſter in 1761. Yet the real fact is, that the lawleſs buccaneers of America were the firſt who introduced us to this trade, and gave riſe to thoſe ſettlements and forts; if either the one or the other

may

may deſerve thoſe names in that part of the country. The crown of Spain poſſeſſed incontrovertably the ſovereignty and dominion of thoſe parts, and complained loudly from the beginning of the intruſion and innovation that had been made upon that part of his territory. This ſubject of complaint continued from that time to this. It was, along with the contraband trade, the cauſe of a war; and hurt the pride and augmented the diſguſt of that court towards Great Britain, which has, in the iſſue, very eminently injured our commercial intereſts with Spain, and advanced thoſe of France. The miniſter of 1761 was too wiſe and too vigilant, as well as too honeſt and firm, to admit or give up any ſuch point of conſequence as the Spaniſh right of dominion in the bay of Honduras, had it not clearly and undeniably exiſted. He therefore perſiſted in our right to the logwood trade, and acknowledged the crown of Spain to have the right of dominion in the country; and the miniſter or miniſters of 1762 would

would have certainly been either much unacquainted with the ſtate of things, or much too captious, to have deviated from ſo clear and equitable a plan of pacification. As to the point of ſecurity, the ſubjects of Great Britain have not only all the ſecurity that the ſubjects of any crown on earth have in the dominions of any other crown; but by this article of the treaty of peace have acquired a legal and acknowledged right to the logwood trade, and to build and occupy houſes and magazines for their families and effects: and are aſſured, by His catholic Majeſty, of the full enjoyment of thoſe advantages and powers on the Spaniſh coaſt and territories, as ſtipulated in the ſaid article. This aſſurance is a ſecurity for advantages and powers far beyond what the ſubjects of any ſtate, conſidered as ſuch, have in the dominions of any other ſtate. And the whole of this article being a condition on the one part and the other, not an act of grace and favour in the Spaniſh crown that may be withdrawn at pleaſure; ſhould any innovations

vations be made and perſiſted in, on the ſide of Spain, it may give us a juſt title and claim to a further and ſtronger ſecurity, that of protecting ourſelves on account of the ill obſervance of his part of the ſtipulated condition: which is a point of ſo much importance, that whilſt it is duly attended to, it may be reaſonably preſumed, the court of Spain will, for their own ſake, think it their intereſt, moſt religiouſly to obſerve their part of the condition, and allow us the full enjoyment of the advantages and powers confirmed to us by this article of the treaty of peace.

An objection hath likewiſe been ſtarted, which is, indeed, rather a criticiſm upon the mode of expreſſion, than an objection againſt the merit of the ſecond article of adjuſtment with Spain, concerning the the right of fiſhing on the banks of Newfoundland. It is confined entirely to the word DESIST, which has been repreſented as too vague and equivocal an expreſſion.

preſſion. Had Spain been ever acknowledged by us to have had that right of fiſhing in the neighbourhood of Newfoundland, to cede reſtore or renounce ſuch right, would have been very proper: but to cede reſtore or renounce a right which we never acknowledged to exiſt, would have appeared not only a little exceptionable in point of language, but, in a political ſenſe, would have been to have granted a great deal too much. To deſiſt from a right which a perſon has formed to himſelf, and which was not acknowledged by the perſon or party, from whom he claimed, ſeems very eaſy to be underſtood; and, in the plain ſimple ſenſe of the word, denotes that right to ceaſe and be annihilated. For as the right was formed by himſelf, it exiſted only by his perſiſting in it; when therefore he deſiſted from, or ceaſed to perſiſt in it, it loſt its exiſtance and became a nonentity. In terms of the article therefore to " deſiſt " as well for himſelf as his ſucceſſors " from all pretenſions which he may have

" formed

"formed," was, very clearly and explicitly, to declare, that that right, or thoſe pretenſions, were extinguiſhed ceaſed and annihilated for ever. On duly reflecting on the import of the word DESIST in this article, and the nature of the right that was to be given up, it may perhaps, notwithſtanding all that has been ſaid againſt it, appear not only proper, but the fulleſt and moſt adequate term that could have been made uſe of upon this occaſion.

FROM this ſurvey of the peace and the merits of the two ſeveral negociations of 1761 and 1762, this concluſion neceſſarily reſults; that the end and motive of the war, and national indemnification and ſecurity, were ſtrictly attended to, and were the primary objects of both: that the acquiſitions of Martinico and the Havana were made uſe of in the treaty of peace, to improve augment and perfect theſe views, not only by the richneſs and extent of the additional dominions thereby ceded and added to the crown of Great Britain

in the regions of North America; but by the boundary and line of ſecurity drawn between us and the French, by which we have the Indian nations left intirely to our own management, and without which the whole that had been obtained in the negociation of 1761 would have been intirely precarious and inſecure: that whatever tended to an adjuſtment in the firſt, was advantageouſly ſettled and eſtabliſhed by the laſt: that whatever was tenaciouſly and obſtinately refuſed by the enemy in the firſt, was wholly and abſolutely given up by him in the laſt: that what had made no part of the firſt conferences, was to the intereſt and emolument of Great Britain adjuſted and fixed by the laſt: and that after having amplified improved and ſecured this firſt grand and national object of dominion in North America, the negociation of 1761 was likewiſe highly improved by the valuable acquiſitions of three in place of two of the neutral iſlands, and the ceſſion of the Grenades and Grenadines, which made up

no part of that firſt negociation.—That in reſpect of the ſecond grand object, the treaty of peace not only opened the way and facilitated the accommodation of the king of Pruſſia with the houſe of Auſtria, by which he obtained all the objects and advantages for which the war had been undertaken; but reſcued the King and kingdom of Portugal from inevitable conqueſt and deſolation: an object not only worthy of the greateſt magnanimity and heroiſm, but which comprehended in it in a very eminent degree the commercial intereſt and felicity of Great Britain.—That along with theſe two grand objects, the treaty of peace adjuſted our differences with Spain upon terms the moſt honourable for the nation, being the very ſame which the court and miniſter of Great Britain had voluntarily offered him in 1761.—And finally that the plan of peace in 1761 being not only perfected in all reſpects, but alſo enlarged and augmented by acquiſitions of much higher importance and value by the treaty of

peace in 1762; whatever praiſe is due to the former, the ſame highly accumulated and increaſed muſt of courſe be due to the latter.—The blind fury of paſſion and party keeps this circumſtance from being attended to; yet it is nevertheleſs neceſſarily true, that theſe negociations muſt ſtand or fall one with the other: for if the plan was good in 1761, the improvements added to it in 1762 made it ſo much better. And thus, after all, we find that the true intereſt of Mr P— and Lord B—, or the partiſans of 1761 and 1762, however violently they juſtle one another, is, in ſo far as relates to the peace, one and the ſame; and that to act with conſiſtency, or have any laſting national applauſe, they muſt agree and ſupport one another in this one point, let them differ ever ſo much in perſonal and private views about the diſpoſal of places and managing the treaſure and power of the nation.

It was obſerved in ſetting out upon this diſquiſition, that the preliminaries of

peace

peace were approved of by parliament; and it becomes now of importance to inſiſt further upon this very material circumſtance. The opinion and judgment and acts of parliament are the legal and conſtitutional opinion and judgment and acts of the nation. It has been ſaid, and will readily be admitted, that parliaments are not infallible; but neither is the nation, were her voice taken by poll. It has been ſaid too, that parliaments may be influenced by paſſion, by party, by bribery and corruption; and ſo likewiſe may the nation. All may have heard, and many may have known this to have been the caſe, to a certain degree, both of the one and the other; and happy would it have been for the cauſe of virtue liberty and the conſtitution, had all theſe evils been prevented and removed, as far as it was at two periods evidently within the power of human wiſdom and true patriot affection to have prevented and remedied them. But it will nevertheleſs remain true, that the voice and ſentiment of parliament

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is the only regular and conſtitutional ſtandard and criterion that we have of the voice and ſentiment of the nation. The Prince therefore endowed with the higheſt patriot virtue, and the utmoſt benevolence and affection towards the freedom liberty and happineſs of his people, will be who in the execution of his royal powers and prerogatives, and in the accompliſhment of the meaſures and plans he has laid down for the honour advantage and utility of his people, conſults with and takes the opinion of his parliament as far as the nature of the tranſaction he has in hand will permit; that from thence, as from the only true and conſtitutional ſource, he may know the minds and ſentiments of his people concerning the object of his purſuit. Miniſters therefore acting under ſuch a prince, encouraging within their reſpective ſpheres ſo amiable a diſpoſition, and deſirous of having their own conduct in bringing about his meaſures inſpected and judged of by the national council, act upon the moſt enlarged plan of popular liberty,

liberty, and moſt agreeably to the genius and ſpirit of the Britiſh conſtitution. And thoſe tranſactions thus brought about and carried into execution with the ſanction and approbation of parliament, are therefore the moſt national, moſt conſtitutional, and moſt perfect acts that can exiſt in the ſtate. This is moſt ſtrictly and truly the caſe of that very treaty of peace, which we have now had under conſideration. The King glorying in the ſuperlative dignity of reigning in the hearts and affections of a great and free people, and his miniſters ambitious to ſubmit their conduct to the diſquiſitions and judgment of the national council, after having exerted the prerogative of the crown in adjuſting the preliminaries of peace with the enemy, freely refered thoſe preliminaries themſelves to the diſcuſſion and opinion of parliament. The parliament in one of its fulleſt ſeſſions in 1762, approved of them in the moſt conſpicuous and diſtinguiſhed manner; the houſe of Lords without the leaſt diviſion, and the houſe of commons with

ſuch

ſuch a diviſion as was of the very leaſt importance, and expreſſed much more properly the impotent acrimony of private pique and diſguſt in a very few individuals, than any difference in public opinion and ſentiment. The King and his miniſters, ſupported thus by the public, the known, the co-operating voice and ſentiment of his people expreſſed in parliament; proceeded in the work of peace, and finally adjuſted it by the difinitive treaty. Addreſſes of congratulation were preſented to the throne from all quarters of the kingdom in conſequence of this event; and on the ſubſequent ſeſſion, in November 1763, the parliament again, by addreſſes from both houſes, renewed its approbation in the ampleſt terms of grateful ſatisfaction and acquieſcence. This fact alone would eſtabliſh and vindicate the peace as a national and conſtitutional act, whatever faults were to be found in it. For the ſame reaſon it would vindicate and juſtify the miniſters concerned in negociating it, becauſe mere

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involuntary errors and miſtakes are, in fallible beings, no ground of juſt repreheniion. But when the merits of the peace, as already diſplayed, are taken into view, the motives of the war accomplished, ineſtimable advantages gained, together with perfect ſecurity in the improvement and enjoyment of them; it becomes then a peace worthy of our higheſt applauſe, and the miniſters of it merit ſurely in courſe ſome eminent degree of our thanks and eſteem.

The virulence and violence of party, and the facility with which it diſpenſes with all regard to truth and decency, is in nothing more conſpicuous, than in imputing this peace to the ſingle arbitrary act of Lord B—; unleſs it be that moſt inſolent and enormous falſehood, by which the judgment and approbation of parliament has been impeached, in the eye of the public, with having been influenced by bribery and corruption.—Bribed and corrupted to do what?—To make a peace,

that is repleat with the moſt eſſential and permanent advantages to the nation, at the whole expence and loſs of the enemy; a peace that extends her dominion, enlarges her power, and amplifies and improves her commerce upon the moſt ſolid laſting and formidable foundations; a peace that prevented her from being overwhelmed with bankruptcy and ruin, which muſt have been her lot by protracting the war under the neceſſary and unavoidable circumſtances of a more exorbitant increaſe of her already enormous and almoſt inſupportable public debt; a peace that put a ſtop to the further effuſion of the blood of her gallant ſons, already too much exhauſted by the war, and in their preſervation preſerved in vigour, what ſolely depended upon them, and was for want of hands in the greateſt hazard of being loſt, her trade her commerce and agriculture; a peace that annihilated and prevented the immediate and moſt direful effects of the moſt abandoned attempt that could be deviſed by the moſt profligate

ſpirit

ſpirit of any faction, that of raiſing internal civil diſſention diſcord and ſedition, by animating and inſpiring one part of the kingdom and people with jealouſy contempt and hatred of the other, when the higheſt unanimity and the whole and intire force of the nation was all little enough to proſecute with ſucceſs the grand object of the war; in ſhort a peace that terminated a moſt deſtructive tho' proſperous war, not only with honour and juſtice, but to the higheſt national advantage and utility, and which notwithſtanding all the paſſion prejudice and indecency of party, is and cannot but be univerſally acknowledged as the beſt peace ever Great Britain made?—Are theſe the objects that are to be aſcertained by bribery and corruption?—Certainly not.—The merit of ſuch conduct juſtifies the actors, and the plan itſelf the approvers of it. Were it even poſſible that the court was under the neceſſity of exerciſing bribery and corruption to procure the national approbation to ſuch a peace as this,

truth would compel us for the firſt time to acknowledge, that in this ſingle caſe, whatever idea we had of the corrupted, the corruptors merited our higheſt praiſe. But in ſo heavy, ſo criminal and deteſtable an accuſation as this, ſhould we not have ſome proof, ſome ſemblance and ſhadow of evidence at leaſt, to influence our belief? Are general warrants ſuch dreadful things? Is the confinement of one man taken up by this kind of warrant, which has in like caſes been the practice of every adminiſtration ſince the revolution, ſo ſhocking in the eye of the public, and ſo tremendouſly dangerous to liberty, as to agitate the courts of law, and engroſs the attention of the nation; and is the honour fame and reputation of ſo many illuſtrious individuals, as compoſe the legiſlature, of no moment? Is the honour fame and reputation of the nation itſelf, known and appearing only by the medium of this auguſt body, of no ſort of eſtimation? What can tend more immediately to ſtir up unjuſt diſcontent and ſedition among the people,

to the overturning of all order reſpect and obedience in the ſtate, than to impreſs upon the minds of men this idea, that the public money is diſſipated in the cauſe of corruption, and that the whole parliament is the paſſive object and patient, influenced and acting under this mercenary leading and direction? And ſhall the groſs inſinuations to this purpoſe of one unhappy and infatuated man, the dupe of his own vanity and paſſion, the tool and firebrand of a party, be received and propagated with ſucceſs, and he himſelf become the object of our compaſſion; whilſt leaving the ſide of candour and judgment, we ſuffer ourſelves to be impreſſed with the baſeſt and falſeſt ideas of our government and legiſlature?—It is impoſſible.—The good ſenſe of the nation, altho' vigorouſly attacked, has not yet been demoliſhed. The natural honour integrity and juſtice of the people, however ſometimes they may be miſled, are ſtill attached to the intereſt of truth order and the conſtitution. Even thoſe who have been

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moſt ſeduced by miſrepreſentation paſſion prejudice, or the fairer allurements of friendſhip and honour, as ſoon as they recollect themſelves, as ſoon as they can think and reaſon with coolneſs and preciſion, will diſcern the weakneſs and folly of imputing undue influence to parliament as the motive of its approbation of the peace, ſince this charge involves equally in guilt the gentlemen of the oppoſition, with thoſe who ſtill adhere to the government; for almoſt the whole of thoſe gentlemen of both houſes of parliament who are now in the oppoſition, concurred in approving the preliminaries of peace. They will readily admit and allow, that to procure the unanimous voice of one houſe, and almoſt the unanimous voice of the other, would have required more money than the government could poſſibly beſtow. In viewing the preſent parliament in point of property riches and rank, they will neceſſarily acknowledge, that the members of it are at leaſt preſumptively as little liable to temptation and undue in-

influence, as any parliament that ever exiſted before; and therefore that ſome degree of evidence is requiſite to make good with the public the looſe vague and paſſionate imputation of corruption. Did any ſuch evidence exiſt, they muſt grant, that none are better qualified to expoſe it to the public eye, both in point of ability and long experience, than ſome of the gentlemen in the oppoſition. The ability and intrepidity of Mr P— is univerſally acknowledged; to the long and active experience of His Grace of N——— in political manœuvres, every borough city and county in Great Britain will bear witneſs: wherefore it might have been expected, that the diſintereſted patriot affection of the firſt would have prompted him from conſcientious duty, as reſentment and the love of power might have impelled the latter to have brought this black iniquity to light, and in open day to have flaſhed conviction on the contaminated chiefs in power, under the broad ſunſhine of the people, had any ſuch iniquity

quity ever had a being. In fine, they will be thoroughly convinced, that no ſums adequate to ſuch a ſervice could have been expended without the chiefs of the oppoſition, who are ſo well acquainted with the affairs of the treaſury and the buſineſs of parliament, having been able in ſpite of any majority whatever to have detected and expoſed the fraud at auditing in parliament the annual accompts of the nation; and from their not having done it, they will naturally and truly conclude, that there was no juſt ground for them to proceed upon, and that the gentleman who threw out this imputation, has only, as uſual, exerciſed his wit to deceive and miſlead them.

When they can think without paſſion and judge without prejudice, they will perceive this oppoſition in itſelf to have commenced upon the narroweſt ſelfiſh motives of private pique and reſentment; and that individuals, ſtimulated by vanity pride and the ambition of being formid-

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able to the adminiſtration, have carried it on upon principles the moſt deſtructive to the liberty, and moſt ruinous to the tranquillity power and greatneſs of the nation. For whatever perſonal animoſity might have ſubſiſted between the chiefs of the oppoſition and the gentlemen of the adminiſtration, whatever real or imaginary injuries might have been apprehended to have been received by the very remarkable gentleman himſelf when he firſt ſeized the pen in 1762, as the perturbator of the public peace and deſtroyer of national unanimity; candour muſt oblige them to confeſs, that the war, the public intereſt, and the high concerns of the nation, were at no time puſhed on with greater vigour, or managed with more judgment and ſucceſs, than in the ſeveral campaigns of that year. This alone were ſufficient to prove, that the cauſe and intereſt of the public was out of the queſtion; and however ſtrong the reſentment might have been againſt thoſe in the adminiſtration, as men and as perſonal rivals in power to

the chiefs of his party, it ought in patriot-juſtice to have ſecured them againſt all attacks as miniſters.—They will readily diſcover, that on the commencement of this attack, far from impeaching public and political conduct, far from approving himſelf the friend of the people and the conſtitution, he began by ſubverting the peace and ſecurity of the public, in attempting to deſtroy a moſt eſſential part of the conſtitution.

No part of the conſtitution ſtands upon a more ſolemn act and compact, than the union of the two kingdoms of England and Scotland, by which they are incorporated into one kingdom and one people. No act of ſtate, whether conſidered by itſelf or in its conſequences, did ever conduce more to the power greatneſs and felicity of the united people and kingdom, than this very act has done by its natural tendency to bind and unite them in the ſame common cauſe and intereſt in peace and war; by which

which the wealth and grandeur of the nation has been enlarged, and its force and influence in the world extended, in a moſt remarkable degree. In flat contradiction to this moſt ſolemn act, this gentleman revived the invidious and juſtly aboliſhed diſtinction of Engliſhman and Scotchman, and maintained and inculcated this new abſurd and moſt malevolent doctrine, that Scotchmen are foreigners and enemies to Engliſhmen, and have oppoſite intereſts and views; and by this means exerted, with indefatigable diligence, all his power of wit paſſion and calumny, to imbitter and enrage the hearts of the people of both theſe parts of the kingdom, with all the violence rancour and hatred of one another that former ages had produced, when they were really two diſtant people, and kingdoms having oppoſite intereſts, and contending with one another for ſecurity dominion and glory. They will readily diſcover and acknowledge, that had this doctrine at the time it was publiſhed, which was in

the moſt critical and trying part of the war, taken root in the minds of the people, and once infatuated our army and navy; this maſked hero of liberty would have had the melancholy joy, however ſucceſsful he might have been in overturning the miniſtry and advancing his own private fortune, of ſeeing the glory of his country and all her important acquiſitions more ſuddenly loſt by the mutual jealouſy ſedition and enmity of her ſons, than they had been gained by their unparalleled bravery, or than the united efforts of all her open and ſecret foreign enemies could have effected. Reflecting on this, and recollecting that the motive for entering upon this horrid and unnatural meaſure, was only to get at the means of defaming one man upon the local diſtinction of his birth, by exhibiting him to the people under the character of a favorite, a foreigner, a proud arrogant and incapable Scott, an enemy to the people, and a favourer of rebellion and the pretender; and by expelling him and the reſt of the

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King's miniſters from the foot of the throne, to occupy their places by the chiefs of his party, and under them by himſelf: they will be amazed at the enterprize, and pity and abhor the weakneſs and foulneſs of that heart, which could throw aſide every kind humane and public feeling, and attempt to involve his country in the hazard of utter deſtruction, in order to gratify the ignoble impulſes of private ambition pride and reſentment.

They will call to mind the caballiſtical hiſtory of Whigs and Tories. How often they have rent the people into the moſt deſtructive factions. How ſeverely they have in their turns perſecuted and calumniated their opponents. How much they have ſoured the temper, divided the intereſts, and weakened the natural ſtrength and influence of the nation. How at times they have blended together, ſeperated again, coaxed and abuſed one another; and even changed their very nature and eſſence according to their particular

ticular intereſts and neceſſities, and as they have been in or out of power. Thus have we ſeen the Whigs, in ſupport of their adminiſtration, acting upon Tory principles; and the Tories in the oppoſition, act upon the broad bottom of liberty and ſound original whiggiſm; whilſt the good-natured well-meaning people aiming only at the removal of their grievances, and the ſecurity of their liberties, have been ſeduced and animated into the utmoſt perſonal violence and enmity; and after a thouſand times truſting hoping and expecting, have ſeen the ends and purpoſes of their chieftans and leaders fully ſerved, but themſelves and intereſts deſerted.—They will remember, upon what terms Mr P— was admitted to, and undertook the lead in one department of government; how leaving the treaſury and the civil and internal adminiſtration of the kingdom to the conduct of thoſe in whoſe hands he found them, he confined himſelf intirely to the management of the war. In guiding and directing this important

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charge, they will keep full in their eye, as the immediate and efficient cauſe of all his glory and ſucceſs, the generous diſintereſted impartial plan he went upon. In his own noble nature not to be controulled by the intereſted ſelf-ſeeking views of factions, he embraced them all as the ſons of liberty, and members of the ſame conſtitution, but none as a party. He looked for merit in every ſoil, and under every denomination; and when he found it, he nouriſhed it, employed it in the public ſervice, and afforded it a fair opportunity for the full exertion of all its abilities. Even thoſe who had been the declared enemies of the crown, and fought againſt it in the rebellion of 1715, he embraced and took under his protection. He generouſly truſted them, and they moſt honourably and faithfully anſwered to the truſt repoſed in them. Thus that part of the highlands which had always ſince the revolution foſtered rebellion, and which under a timid and intereſted adminiſtration always might have done ſo, was reduced

duced by generous confidence to faithful ſubjection, and afforded a valuable quota of ſtrength and martial ſpirit in the proſecution of the war. And thus, by uniting the whole ſtrength affection and power of the nation againſt her enemies, he amazed all Europe with victories and conqueſts beyond what ſhe had ever been thought able to effect. At this time neither the names of Whigs nor Tories, Engliſhmen nor Scotchmen, were heard of as diſtinctions and grounds of enmity; but the arms of Great Britain, and the fame and valour of her united ſons, were what we heard of, and acknowledged, in all quarters of the world.

THEY will remember when our preſent moſt amiable Sovereign aſcended the throne, and gloried in being born a Briton, that he, and agreeably to his great and royal inclinations his ſervants and miniſters who had attended him into the government, being determined to improve upon this plan by extending it to the civil

civil as well as military departments of the ſtate, declared that His Majeſty's ambition was to be the Sovereign not of a party or faction, but of the whole of his people; not to govern the intereſts of a few ambitious or avaricious men, but to employ men of merit and worth under whatever faction they might have been formerly ranked; and to reign in the hearts of his people without the aids of bribery and corruption, according to the true genius and ſpirit of the laws and conſtitution. So great a bleſſing, before this auſpicious period, might have been wiſhed for, but was not to be expected; and happy had it been could the ignoble ſpirit of party have ſubmitted, without a ſtruggle, to ſuch ſalutary and benevolent diſpoſitions in a ſovereign.

When Mr P— reſigned, they will recollect that it happened ſolely, tho' moſt unfortunately, from a difference in opinion upon a queſtion at that time very dubious and uncertain, reſpecting what ſhould be

the conduct of Great Britain towards Spain; a queſtion in which the duke of N——— and all the members of the council, except Lord T——, were clearly of an oppoſite opinion to Mr P—. This reſignation however had no immediate extraordinary conſequences. The King and his miniſters proceeded in their plan. Lord E——— was appointed to ſucceed Mr P—. Vigorous meaſures were purſued in regard to the war; and Mr P— himſelf, far from oppoſing, ſtrengthened the hands of government with his hearty concurrence in raiſing the ſupplies for the ſervice of the year 1762. But in the May following, as the King's plan extended in its execution of embracing and taking into the aſſiſtance of government whomſoever he thought worthy of being honoured with his confidence without diſtinction of parties; the bottom of adminiſtration became enlarged, the influence of the old ſyſtem grew more and more contracted; and, diſguſted at this alteration, His Grace of N——— reſigned.

HERE commences the æra of the preſent oppoſition.—So ancient a ſervant of the crown, ſo veteran a leader of a party, ſo trained and expert in intrigue, and who in the courſe of his adminiſtration in different apartments, and eſpecially in the treaſury, had ſerved or obliged almoſt every man in or connected with government, muſt neceſſarily have ſtrong perſonal influence, formidable alliances, and numerous dependents. Hope fear and even gratitude brought many immediately to eſpouſe his fortunes. The open and avowed attack made upon the adminiſtration by thoſe who remained behind, brought about their expulſion from the places they had retained; and the clamour and reſentment of all thoſe, who as friends or relations to the one or other were affected by it, augmented the number and ill humour of the party. As approaches were made towards an amicable accommodation between the belligerant powers, freſh acquiſitions were gained to this ſide

from the extreme martial ſpirit of the people themſelves, and the intereſts of thoſe whoſe fortunes depended upon the continuance of the war; which of courſe made both of them averſe to the peace.—Supported by ſo formidable a body, the political batteries of defamation began to open, and were inceſſently plied againſt the government. All that wit humour fancy or malice could invent, was played off to captivate and inſnare the public, and to miſrepreſent and blacken the King's ſervants.—To have encountered fair, and acknowledged His Majeſty's generous conſtitutional plan of government, muſt have ruined their cauſe; for the people would then have readily ſeen through all their fallacy, and been convinced that meaſures and not men, ought to be the object of attention: that the intereſt of the nation, not that of a party, ſhould be preferred; and that a ſyſtem of government embracing and comprehending all parties, would neceſſarily aboliſh them, bring about univerſal harmony, and fix the fu-

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ture ſtandard of judgment concerning a good or bad adminiſtration, to its conformity with or deviation from the laws and conſtitution, not the intereſt of the caballiſtical factions whether Whig or Tory.—For this reaſon therefore the engineers employed in this foul work, deepened their diſguiſe; and knowing the habitude of the nation to ſerve the purpoſes of a few individuals under the notion of their being of this or that ſect, and that Whig and Tory had on many occaſions been as ſucceſsful in raiſing confuſion and ſerving the purpoſes of ambition in Great Britain, as ever the factions of the Blue and Green were at Conſtantinople, or the Guelfs and Gibellines in Italy: they painted themſelves, under the denomination of Whigs, as the true friends of liberty and the conſtitution; and repreſented the adminiſtration, the forces, the Jacobites, and the Scotch, as united and leagued together for the deſtruction of both. The portraits of weak princes, flagitious favorites, abandoned women, were from ancient and

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modern hiſtory obtruded upon the people, in formal periodical and daily publications; and from thence imputations and ſurmiſes impreſſed upon the minds of the vulgar, as ungenerous and baſe, as falſe indecent and groundleſs: portraits that could only proceed from men as abandoned and loſt to public honour and reſpect, as in private life they were to the tendereſt ſocial duties and the moſt obligatory ties of virtue and religion.—To Lord B—— was imputed the reſignation of Mr P—, though no act was ever more freely and determinately the deed of the agent himſelf, than that was of Mr P—; and altho' the chiefs of the oppoſition, and every member preſent in the council, except Lord T——, were profeſſedly and avowedly, by differing from him in opinion, as much the cauſe of it as that Lord.—Lord B— was accuſed of engroſſing the King's ear, when at no time miniſters of every denomination breathed a freer air, had more the exertion of their own influence in their

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ſeveral departments, or any ſovereign encouraged more the unreſtrained exertion of that freedom.—The number of Scotch introduced into the army, and eſpecially thoſe highlanders who had been formerly in the rebellion of 1745, were imputed to him as another crime, altho' both the one and the other happened before he was in the adminiſtration, having been brought about under the direction and leading of the Duke of N——— and Mr P—; nay, altho' the nation ſtood in the utmoſt need of them, and their ſervice gave the greateſt ſatisfaction; and altho' the meaſure itſelf was not only judicious, but popular; and at the time it was taken, moſt highly approved of by the leaders of this very oppoſition.—To this Lord B— was imputed the very reverſe of every thing he profeſſed, of every thing he aimed at; nor could the moſt fair and unblemiſhed conduct througbout the whole of his paſt life, ſave him from being repreſented by calumny in the intereſt of the pretender, in the intereſt of the French King, an enemy

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to the conſtitution, the promoter of arbitrary government; and that he and his countrymen the Scotch, had no right to employments and places of any kind, as being foreigners and enemies to Engliſhmen and their laws.—All theſe things, incredible in themſelves, and contradictory to fact, were enforced, in defiance of common ſenſe, with ſhameleſs intrepidity, and by all the arts and allurements of the moſt fertile and foul imagination. Poetry and proſe were united to attract the public attention in favour of this enormous ſyſtem of falſehood; and the combined influence and credit of the emiſſaries of faction were exerted to the utmoſt for the ſame purpoſe.—They will recollect, and on recollection acknowledge, that all theſe virulent aſſertions without any evidence, and many of them in their very nature contrary to truth, were but the ungenerous arts of the engines of a party to gain their chieftains and themſelves popularity, and to overſet the beneficent ſalutary and truly patriot intention of their Prince in favour

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of his people, that a few individuals might again recover the reins of government, rule by the maxims of faction, and keep the nation, as formerly, divided, discontented and weak.

This will further appear to be the case, from the indecent noise and clamour raised about the cyder act, in which if there was any error, the parliament, and not Lord B—, were accountable for it; from their redoubled efforts of abuse against this nobleman, even after he had resigned his place in the administration, and retired into private life; from the outrageous insult committed upon His Majesty's speech to parliament; from the flimsy disguise of affected regard to the liberties of the people upon the subject of general warrants, by a man who has most licentiously violated the majesty and rights of the whole legislature; from the foul gross and more than black-guard abuse poured forth upon His Majesty's ministers, when Lord B— was no more of that

number ; and chiefly and above all from the conduct of the oppoſition, when His Majeſty wanted in the courſe of laſt year Mr P— again in his ſervice. This gen-leman had ſtood nobly recollected in him-ſelf, unconnected with any private views, and intirely his own maſter, till in an evil hour in the ſummer of 1763 he was brought within the vortex of the oppo-ſition ; ſo that when the King wanted to honour him with his favour, and employ him in his ſervice, he appeared to be ſo fettered by his late connections, as to be induced moſt ungenerouſly to demand terms and conditions of capitulation from his Sovereign ; to demand the diſmiſſion of ſome of his miniſters from their places, that certain chiefs of the oppoſition might occupy them in their room.—Reflecting on this, the whole world muſt acknow-ledge, how fully it proves, that the ſecret and primary aim of the oppoſition is to obtain an excluſive power in the admini-ſtration ; to rule by the partial fury and prejudice of a party ; to make an inſtru-

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ment of this great man for only accomplishing their own selfish purposes; and to embitter the reign of His Majesty, perplex his government, enfeeble the nation, disappoint or retard all the advantages naturally arising from the peace; and distress his ministers as far as their power art and influence extend, until they can obtain this.—What pity that so able a man as Mr P—, in whom we would gladly wish to find no speck or stain: who, before this period, had, like the good Timoleon, exhibited a noble instance of public virtue and true greatness of mind: what pity, I say, that he should have been driving in the impetuous current of ambition, and seemingly to take hold of this twig of faction to vault again into the seat of government.—What pity that he should still be so fettered and restrained by these unhappy connections, as to be without the power of serving a Sovereign he loves, and by whom he is so much beloved and honoured.—Perceiving all this, the whole

world will acknowledge what need His Majeſty has of all his royal fortitude to reſiſt the chains that are forged for him, and to ſave his people from the timid weak and partial government of a party.

Upon the whole then, whoever will with temper and candour review and examine this peace with reſpect to the motives of the war, the fair uniform conſiſtant ſentiment of the people; the application of the immutable principle of right and wrong; the indiſpenſible and capital intereſt of the kingdom; the true genuine merits of the two ſeveral negociations of 1761 and 1762; and the national aſſent and approbation expreſſed by the almoſt unanimous voice of parliament: will naturally and neceſſarily acknowledge it to be an honourable ſafe and advantageous peace, moſt ſuperlatively adequate to the motives and cauſes of the war, and a peace of immenſe acquiſitions which in their very nature contain a full indemnification.

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The oppoſition therefore made to this peace, and the ſpirit temper and conduct with which it has been carried on, being duly conſidered and contracted with the equitable generous conſtitutional plan of His Majeſty for embracing and comprehending all his people, and uniting all the partial detached and paſſionate intereſts of parties into one general public intereſt; muſt appear to be unconſtitutional private and ſelfiſh, tending to divide the people, promote faction, embarraſs government, innervate and weaken the power and importance of the nation, and to loſe all the ineſtimable advantages ſo lately acquired by ſo vigorous a war, and ſecured by ſo equitable a peace.

I AM far from thinking, that the gentlemen in the oppoſition have all theſe dreadful conſequences in view as the objects of their purſuit. Paſſion, prejudice, intereſt, perſonal piques and enmities, may have concealed them from their obſervation,

ſervation, and even with many have juſtified their proceedings to themſelves as fair laudable and the effects of genuine patriotiſm; I only ſay, and muſt conclude with this remark, that theſe dreadful conſequences naturally flow from the oppoſition, upon the principles it is now made, and in the manner it has hitherto been conducted: that it is therefore their indiſpenſible duty to think and judge and act, uninfluenced by the violent impulſes of paſſion; to conform their judgment and conduct not to their own, but to the public intereſt; to oppoſe not men, on account of their having His Majeſty's good grace and eſteem, or for the ſake of their places and the power that attends them, but meaſures that may deviate from or be oppoſed to the ſpirit of the conſtitution; to adhere to and ſupport His Majeſty in eſtabliſhing his benevolent ſyſtem, aboliſhing all party diſtinctions, and promoting the univerſal concord and felicity of his people; or if they will not

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be active in this noble duty, at leaſt not to obſtruct thoſe who are already engaged, or willing to engage in it. This truth is certainly clear, that inclined ever ſo much as ſome of theſe gentlemen may be to continue in the oppoſition, all the genuine lovers of liberty and the freedom of the conſtitution; all thoſe who ſincerely wiſh to ſee the nation proſperous in peace, victorious in war, a ſure ſhield of defence to her friends, and a bullwark of terror againſt her foes, will martial themſelves on the ſide of national unanimity and concord; on that ſide which endeavours to improve and make the moſt of all thoſe great advantages we have obtained by the peace; on the ſide of order obedience and ſubmiſſion to the laws, which is the pureſt and moſt perfect liberty: and ſupported by theſe and his own royal intrepidity and perſeverance, we may with the founded confidence hope to ſee His Majeſty and the conſtitution triumph over every partial and ſelfiſh intereſt,

tereſt, over all the wayward purſuits and attempts of faction and ambition, to the full eſtabliſhment, the glory grandeur and felicity of Great Britain, ſo as to endear to all poſterity the auſpicious reign of our truly Britiſh Prince and Patriot King.

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